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THE DANGERS OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?
STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* & EWA M. DAVISON**
ABSTRACT
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), a landmark piece of legislation aimed at protecting
copyright holders from those who might manufacture or traffic
technology capable of allowing users to evade piracy protections on
the underlying work. At its core, the DMCA flatly prohibits the
circumvention of “technological protection measures” in order to gain
access to copyrighted works, but provides no safety valve for any
traditionally protected uses. While hailed as a victory by the software
and entertainment industries, the academic and scientific communi-
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ties have been far less enthusiastic. The DMCA’s goal of combating
piracy is a noble one, but lurking is the danger that it comes at the
expense of public access to protected works and future innovation.
Despite America’s long history of “fair use” protections in copyright
law, commentators have warned that consumers now find themselves
unable to do many of the same things with copyrighted works that
they previously could—anyone who might sell them the technology to
access a protected work and enable fair use would find themselves in
violation of the DMCA. Worse, early litigation dramatically ex-
panded the definition of what constitutes a “technological protection
measure” deserving of the law’s respect. As the definition broadened,
scholars feared that even modest innovations—ones that would never
qualify for a patent under existing law—could wind up receiving
perpetual patent-like protection through the backdoor of the DMCA.
Despite the experts’ dire predictions, however, subsequent common
law interpretation of the DMCA has reined in many of its potential
dangers. The judiciary’s focus has rightly shifted to the need to
balance innovators’ interests with the equally important goals of
public access and enhancing overall social welfare. Nonetheless,
coherent and uniform protection of fair use under the DMCA is likely
best achieved through congressional action.
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1. John Borland, Sony Puts Aibo to Sleep, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.
news.com/sony-puts-aibo-to-sleep/2100-1041_3-6031649.html.
2. See generally David Labrador, Teaching Robot Dogs New Tricks, SCI. AM., Jan. 21,
2002, available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=teaching-robot-dogs-new-t; Farhad
Manjoo, Aibo Owners Biting Mad at Sony, WIRED, Nov. 2, 2001, available at http://www.
wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2001/11/48088.
3. See Labrador, supra note 2.
4. See id.
5. See Manjoo, supra note 2 (quoting Richard Walkus, an Aibo owner).
6. See Labrador, supra note 2.
7. See Manjoo, supra note 2.
INTRODUCTION
Sony Corporation discontinued production of Aibo in 2006,1 but
not before this small robotic dog became a vivid illustration of the
controversy surrounding the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).2 A hacker known only as AiboPet reverse-engineered
Sony’s source code and generated tools allowing Aibos to, among
other things, dance, respond to wireless commands, and share what
they see.3 AiboPet then shared those tools with other Aibo owners
over the Internet.4 Aibo owners responded enthusiastically; as one
such Sony customer commented: 
Aibo is an exciting toy, but Aibopet’s enhancements kept the
excitement going.... He’s made tools to see what mood Aibo was
in, or set it in different life stages, or have better wireless
communications. There are tools to see in real time what Aibo
sees, and vital signs, emotions, mood, voice recognition. Those
were enhancements riding on top of Sony’s Aibo that Aibopet
created.5
AiboPet never revealed Sony’s encryption code.6 Moreover AiboPet
earned no money from distributing his programs, and in fact, likely
enhanced Sony’s product sales.7 As another Aibo owner noted: 
If it had not been for AiboPet’s information, his invaluable
knowledge and his generosity in sharing it with the Aibo
community, I would not have purchased an Aibo, all the various
354 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:349
8. See Labrador, supra note 2.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
12. 144 CONG. REC. S12375 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
13. Statement on Signing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1902-03
(Oct. 29, 1998).
14. 5 WILLIAM H. MANZ, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF THE
MAJOR ENACTMENTS OF THE 105TH CONGRESS (1999) (compendium of legislative histories
spanning over one year relating to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
15. Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WCT].
16. Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
17. WCT, supra note 15, at 68 pmbl.; WPPT, supra note 16, at 79 pmbl.
18. See ROBERT BURNETT & P. DAVID MARSHALL, WEB THEORY 144 (2003). See generally
Mauricio España, The Fallacy That Fair Use and Information Should Be Provided for Free:
An Analysis of the Responses to the DMCA’s Section 1201, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 135, 170
(2003). 
software, [memory] sticks and yes, even my computer, a Sony
VAIO, which I only purchased because of its stick reader.8 
Nonetheless, on October 26, 2001, Sony Entertainment Robots
America informed AiboPet that he was violating the DMCA and
demanded that he remove from the Internet all programs based on
Sony’s Aibo software.9 Within a month, however, Sony retreated
from this position in response to customer outrage and a threatened
boycott of Sony products.10
What spawned this unfortunate tale? The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)11—controversial legislation passed by the
U.S. Congress on October 12, 1998,12 and signed into law two weeks
later by President Clinton.13 The enactment marked the culmination
of months of heated debate over the purpose and particulars of
the DMCA14 and coincided with the implementation of two inter-
national treaties signed in December 1996, at the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Geneva conference. At that momen-
tous meeting, the United States signed onto the WIPO Copyright
Treaty15 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.16
Both were designed to offer protections to the signatory countries’
international copyright holders in light of fears surrounding
emerging technologies in a global digital age.17 
Within American borders, the DMCA was supported by the
software and entertainment industries, and generally opposed by
scientists, librarians, and academics.18 Controversy surrounding the
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19. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has become an outspoken opponent
of the DMCA. See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, DMCA, http://www.eff.org/issues/
dmca (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
20. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Technology; Efforts to Stop Music Swapping Draw More Fire,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at C1; Labrador, supra note 2.
21. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.1, at 18 (1998).
implications of the DMCA, however, has not been confined to
these interest groups.19 Since the DMCA’s reach extends to millions
of everyday technology consumers, the public at large has been
brought into the debate on new technologies that offer seemingly
unbounded access to information and creative works.20
This Article serves as an overview of the judicial and legislative
copyright environment following enactment of the DMCA. Part I
introduces the legislative history and public policy purposes
behind Congress’s passage of the DMCA. Part II examines the
language of the DMCA and maps pertinent case law as DMCA
jurisprudence began to emerge in the United States. Next, Part III
reviews pending legislation proposed in response to some of the
unintended dangers posed by the DMCA. Part IV analyzes the
current judicial trend toward narrowing the DMCA. Finally, Part V
concludes that this recent case law has brought application of the
DMCA more closely—although not fully—in line with congressional
intent, as well as with sound public policy and traditionally accepted
intellectual property principles.
I. THE GOLDEN ROAD TO THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
In implementing the DMCA, Congress expressly rejected absolute
liability for circumvention of technological protection measures
shielding copyrighted works, as well as for the enablement of such
circumvention. Rather, Congress sought to carefully balance the
needs of copyright owners threatened by the ease of piracy in a
digital era with the needs of the public for access to information and
creative content. As revealed by the legislative history of the DMCA,
Congress—envisioning a statutory scheme aimed at so-called “black
boxes” and not at devices with substantial noninfringing uses—
intended the doctrine of fair use to limit the DMCA’s scope.21
The signatory parties to the two 1996 WIPO treaties declared a
noble desire to protect the rights of literary and artistic authors in
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22. WCT, supra note 15, at 68 pmbl.; WPPT, supra note 16, at 79 pmbl.
23. WCT, supra note 15, at 68 pmbl.; WPPT, supra note 16, at 79 pmbl.
24. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997). Although the circumvention prohibitions contained in
H.R. 2281 and in the DMCA are almost identical, the former excepted only law enforcement
and intelligence activities from liability. Id. § 1201(e).
25. 144 CONG. REC. E2136, E2136-37 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley)
(“As proposed by the Clinton Administration, however, the anti-circumvention provisions to
implement the WIPO treaties would have represented a radical departure from this [balance
between the public interest and those of copyright owners] tradition. In a September 16, 1997
letter to Congress, 62 distinguished law professors expressed their concern about the
implications of regulating devices through proposed section 1201. They said in relevant part:
‘[E]nactment of Section 1201 would represent an unprecedented departure into the zone of
what might be called paracopyright—an uncharted new domain of legislative provisions
designed to strengthen copyright protection by regulating conduct which traditionally has
fallen outside the regulatory sphere of intellectual property law.’”).
26. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
27. See 144 CONG. REC. at E2136, E2137 (statement of Rep. Bliley); see also infra notes
89-109 and accompanying text (discussing Sony).
28. 144 CONG. REC. at E2136, E2137 (statement of Rep. Bliley).
29. Id. at E2136 (“The WIPO treaties permit considerable flexibility in the means by
which they may be implemented. The texts agreed upon by the delegates to the December
a uniform manner, recognizing the profound impact of recent
developments in communication technologies on the creation, use,
and exploitation of such works.22 At the same time, the WIPO
treaties stressed the need to protect the larger public interest in
access, research, and education.23 As originally proposed for
ratification by the Clinton Administration,24 congressional leaders
feared that the WIPO-related legislation would shift this pri-
vate/public balance, making illegal what had previously been in
the public interest as “perfectly lawful.”25 The Administration’s
proposed language was also interpreted to overrule the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.,26 which had held that VCR manufacturers could
legitimately make devices that allowed taping of copyrighted
programs without fear of prosecution for contributory infringement
of the underlying copyright.27 
In response to the Clinton Administration’s proposal for ratifying
the WIPO treaties, Representative Tom Bliley, Chairman of the
Committee on Commerce, highlighted the flexibility in the WIPO
treaties negotiated by the delegates.28 The texts of the treaties,
Bliley noted, called for fashioning new solutions consistent with the
Berne Convention while accommodating relevant national legal
frameworks.29 Indeed, Representative Boucher championed the
2008] THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 357
1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference specifically allow contracting states to ‘carry forward and
appropriately extend into the digital environment limitation and exceptions in their national
laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention’ and to ‘devise new
exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network environment.’”). The
Berne Convention, first formed in 1886 but subsequently revised and amended, established
not only certain minimum standards of copyright protection but also the principle of national
treatment. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 1, 5, Sept.
9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Specifically, signatory states must afford the same
protections to foreign as to domestic authors. Id. at art. 5(1). The United States did not
become a signatory until 1988. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
30. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Rick Boucher, Boucher and Campbell Introduce
Comprehensive Copyright Legislation (Nov. 14, 1997), available at http://www.ninch.org/
news/currentannounce/boucher.html.
31. 144 CONG REC. E2136, E2137 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
32. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.2, at 86 (1998).
33. Id. at 25.
34. Id.
35. See 144 CONG. REC. S9935, S9935 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft)
(citing educational institutions’ rejections of Senate language).
retention of the fair use doctrine as consistent with the text of the
WIPO treaties.30 Thus, quite significantly, Congress rejected a
blanket implementation of the Clinton Administration’s proffered
text as wholly unnecessary to ratification of the WIPO treaties.31 
Still, piracy concerns permeated the debates leading up to the
signing of the DMCA.32 Congressmembers feared the collapse of the
entertainment industry at the hands of anyone with a mouse,
zipping off near-perfect duplicated files at little expense or effort of
their own.33 The Commerce Committee summarized the concern
starkly: 
[T]he digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of
copyright owners, and as such, necessitates protection against
devices that undermine copyright interests. In contrast to the
analog experience, digital technology enables pirates to repro-
duce and distribute perfect copies of works—at virtually no cost
at all to the pirate. As technology advances, so must our laws.34
On the opposite side of the controversy, educational institutions
and libraries sounded warning that a restrictive “pay-per-use
society” would result under the Senate’s version of the Act, because
it erred heavily on the side of preventing piracy—and forsaking
public access.35 The Senate’s language contained a flat prohibition
358 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:349
36. The TPM acronym is borrowed from España, supra note 18, at 148 n.91; TPM is an
expansive term that includes what is also referred to as “protective technology,” “anti-piracy
measures,” “copy-control technologies,” etc. For consistency, TPM is used throughout this
paper.
37. 144 CONG. REC. at S9935 (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
39. 144 CONG. REC. H7074, H7100 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Klug).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(D) (2000).
43. Id.; see also 144 CONG. REC. E2136, E2137 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Bliley) (noting his belief that this provision “establishe[s] an appropriate environment in
on the circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs)36
in order to gain access to copyrighted works, with no safety valve for
any traditionally protected uses.37 For example, the fair use doctrine
has long afforded access to copyrighted works for purposes such as
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship or
research.”38
Summarizing the challenge, Representative Klug noted that
Congress was faced with “a very difficult balancing act.”39 On the
one hand, it was “essentially trying to protect the American creative
community across the world.”40 On the other, Klug warned:
[I]n an era of exploding information, we also have to guarantee
access to libraries and also university researchers, to make sure
we do not enter a new era of pay per view, where the use of a
library card always carries a fee and where the flow of informa-
tion comes with a meter that rings up a charge every time the
Internet is accessed.41
The tension between these two objectives was unmistakable as
Congress attempted to strike a compromise reflecting the legitimate
concerns of both creators and the consuming public. Ultimately,
legislators retained the strong anticircumvention language origi-
nally proposed, but qualified it in two important respects. First, the
DMCA exempts from circumvention liability persons who make
noninfringing use of copyrighted works, where such works fall into
a class identified by the Librarian of Congress.42 In this manner, the
DMCA allows the Librarian of Congress to take into account the
potentially negative impact of the DMCA on education, research,
and the like.43 Second, the DMCA also contains several exemptions
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which the fair use interests of society at large can be properly addressed”).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(j) (2000).
45. One should note that this expressed intent reinforces the notion that subsequent
judicial interpretation of § 1201 has departed from congressional intent. See infra Part II.C.
46. 144 CONG. REC. at E2137 (statement of Rep. Bliley).
47. Id.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.1, at 18 (1998) (“Paragraph (a)(1) does not apply to the
subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy of a
work protected under Title 17, even if such actions involve circumvention of additional forms
of technological protection measures. In a fact situation where the access is authorized, the
traditional defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, would be fully applicable.
So, an individual would not be able to circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a
work, but would be able to do so in order to make fair use of a work which he or she has
acquired lawfully.”).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000) (“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this Title.”); 144
CONG. REC. E2144, E2144 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“We also
sought to ensure that consumers could apply their centuries-old fair use rights in the digital
to circumvention liability in addition to the original legislation’s
exemption for law enforcement and intelligence activities.44
In the final Commerce Committee report, Representative Bliley
clarified the legislative intent of section 1201 of the DMCA as
follows: he noted that § 1201 was designed to sustain the Sony
rationale (thus allowing manufacture of devices that might poten-
tially infringe anticircumvention technology, so long as those
devices were capable of substantial noninfringing uses),45 enable the
fair use defense, and allow “consumer electronics, telecommunica-
tions, computer, and other legitimate device manufacturers ... the
freedom to design new products without being subjected to the
threat of litigation for making design decisions.”46 Congressmembers
believed that the additional exemptions qualifying the DMCA’s
anticircumvention language scaled back any anticircumvention
“right,” thus preventing a copyright owner from obstructing the
manufacture and sale of devices that allow users to make fair-use
copies of copyrighted works.47 Moreover, the Committee on the
Judiciary opined that the traditional defenses to copyright infringe-
ment, which include an individual’s fair use, would still apply even
where circumvention technology is used, so long as the access to the
copyrighted work was authorized in the first instance.48 As enacted,
Congress expressly intended the circumvention section of the Act to
allow for the continued vitality of the centuries-old fair use defense
to copyright infringement.49
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age.”).
50. 144 CONG. REC. at E2136 (statement of Rep. Bliley) (“I don’t want there to be any
misunderstanding about the scope of this legislation, especially the very limited scope of the
device provisions in Title I and the very broad scope of the exceptions to section 1201(a)(1).”).
51. Id. at E2137 (“[T]he Committee endeavored to specify ... how the anti-circumvention
right ... would be qualified to maintain balance between the interests of content creators and
information users.”); 144 CONG. REC. H7074, H7100 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Klug) (referring to the DMCA as a “very difficult balancing act”); see also 144 CONG. REC.
H10615, H10621 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Klug) (“I’m very pleased that the
conferees have meaningfully clarified that the Sony decision remains valid law.”).
52. 144 CONG. REC. at H7100 (statement of Rep. White) (emphasis added). Notably, “our
view” of intellectual property has encompassed the fair use doctrine for centuries. See, e.g.,
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation and Context, 41 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 447, 547 (2007).
53. 144 CONG. REC. S11887, S11888 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft);
144 CONG. REC. S9935, S9936 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
54. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.2, at 87 (1998).
55. 144 CONG. REC. at S9936 (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also 144 CONG. REC. at
H7094 (statement of Rep. Bliley) (noting that § 1201(a)(2) is “aimed fundamentally at
outla[w]ing so-called ‘black boxes’ that are expressly intended to facilitate circumvention of
protection measures for purposes of gaining access to a work ... not ... at products that are
capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses”).
Representative Tom Bliley reaffirmed the legislative intent
behind the revised provisions contained in the final Conference
Report as a limitation on the DMCA’s scope.50 That is, legislators
perceived the revised legislation as maintaining the delicate
balance struck between content creators and information users.51
Indeed, Representative White characterized the DMCA as “a big win
for our country, because ... in essence ... it implements a treaty
under which the rest of the world finally adopts our view of intellec-
tual property. That is a big win for the United States.”52
The DMCA legislative history also contemplates continuing
innovation and competition for noninfringing devices.53 In the final
Commerce Committee Report to the House, for example, Represen-
tatives Klug and Boucher highlighted their intent that innovation
not be impeded: “Whatever protections Congress grants should not
be wielded as a club to thwart consumer demand for innovative
products, consumer demand for access to information, consumer
demand for tools to exercise their lawful rights, and consumer
expectations that the people and expertise will exist to service these
products.”54 Senator Ashcroft also observed that the DMCA was
“aimed fundamentally at so-called ‘black-boxes’ and not at legiti-
mate products that have substantial noninfringing uses.”55 In fact,
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56. 144 CONG. REC. at S9936 (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
57. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984) (citing the
exception for “substantial non-infringing use[s]” in the Patent Code, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)). For
example, permissible fair uses would include criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research. For more on the Sony decision, see infra notes 89-109 and
accompanying text.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
59. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.02[B][2], at
in explaining provisions that leave intact preexisting incentives to
innovate, Ashcroft clarified that “[t]echnology and engineers—not
lawyers—should dictate product design.”56 Notably, the term
“substantial non-infringing uses” used by Ashcroft mirrors the
language used in the Patent Code and applied to copyright law by
the Supreme Court in Sony, which by analogizing copyrights and
patents established “capab[ility] of substantial noninfringing uses”
as a defense to contributory copyright infringement.57 
II. INTERPRETING THE DMCA
In an effort to examine and make sense of the DMCA, Part II of
this paper analyzes: a) the language of the statute itself, b) the
relevant case law existing prior to its enactment, and c) the common
law that first emerged in the post-DMCA world. Unfortunately,
early judicial interpretation undermined Congress’s noble intent in
passing the DMCA by frustrating the protections that were built
into the Act (and which were embodied in well-settled intellectual
property law). 
A. The DMCA’s Key Provision: An Anticircumvention Rule 
To understand the DMCA, we must first examine the language
of this groundbreaking statute. First, the DMCA establishes a
general “anticircumvention” prohibition in § 1201(a)(1)(A): “[n]o
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright] title.”58 In
plain English, this provision makes it illegal to evade antipiracy
measures or technological protection measures (TPMs) that police
access to a protected work. Intellectual property law heavyweight
David Nimmer puts it simply: section 1201 mandates respect for
copyright owners’ use of TPMs to control access to their work.59 The
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12A-13 (2007).
60. Id. § 12A.03[A][1][a], at 12A-16.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
62. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C). Where a third party markets the device or component, however,
the provider must “act[ ] in concert” with the third party and have “knowledge” of the
marketing to be liable. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(C).
63. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
64. Id. § 1201(b)(1); see JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, CYBERLAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM § 1.02  (2000, updated 2007) (comparing
the § 1201 rules).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(2)(A) (2000).
66. See United States v. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118-19 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The court
explained the trafficking of a software product that can alter a “read-only” restriction
contained in Adobe Acrobat files. The technology in question enabled a purchaser of an eBook
to engage in “fair use” without infringing the copyright laws—for example, by allowing the
statute thus bars “breaking into” any copyrighted work that the
copyright owner has purposefully locked up using technology.60 
The real muscle behind the anticircumvention rule lies in the
two DMCA “antitrafficking” provisions that target hacker-devices
at their source, outlawing their manufacture and sale. First,
§ 1201(a)(2) places an outright ban on “traffic[king]” in any
“technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof”
that can be used to gain access to TPM-entombed works.61 The
provision of a decryption technology device or component is only
unlawful, however, if that device or component is either primarily
designed for the purpose of overcoming TPMs, has limited commer-
cial significance other than circumvention, or is marketed for use in
circumventing TPMs.62 For the purposes of § 1201(a)(2), to circum-
vent a TPM means: “to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate,
or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the
copyright owner.”63 Second, § 1201(b)(1) provides an antitrafficking
provision nearly identical to that in § 1201(a)(2), but addresses
trafficking as it relates to TPMs that control specific uses of a work,
as compared to access.64 For the purposes of § 1201(b)(1), therefore,
to circumvent a TPM means: “avoiding, bypassing, removing, deac-
tivating, or otherwise impairing a technological measure” that limits
the exercise of a copyright privilege.65 For instance, it would be
unlawful under this subsection to provide the means for end-users
to manipulate a copyrighted “read-only” file that was policed by a
TPM that shielded against such alterations.66 
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lawful owner of the eBook to read it on another computer, to make a back-up copy, or to print
the eBook in paper form. The same technology, however, could also allow a user to engage in
copyright infringement by making and distributing unlawful copies of the eBook. Id.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2000) (providing civil remedies for violation of §§ 1201 and 1202).
68. Id. § 1203(c).
69. Id. § 1204(a).
70. Although § 1201 contains three anticircumvention-related rules, this paper uses the
term in singular form to stand for all three rules of § 1201, unless specially discussed.
71. See DRATLER & MCJOHN, supra note 64, at 1-8.
72. See id. at 1-9; NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12A-15.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000).
74. Id. § 1201(f). The Act defines interoperability as “the ability of computer programs to
exchange information.” Id. § 1201(f)(4). Assessment of interoperability, or “reverse
engineering,” occurs where an individual lawfully obtains the right to use a computer program
and analyzes the elements of the program (and the accompanying TPMs) in order to enable
compatibility with other, independently created computer programs. Id. § 1201(f)(1), (4).
75. Id. § 1201(j).
76. Id. § 1201(d) (specifying that education-related organizations can use circumvention
measures to gain access to copyrighted works “solely in order to make a good faith
determination of whether to acquire a copy of that work,” but that access to the work is
temporally limited); see NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12A-43 n.4 (borrowing the term “shopping
privilege” from Representative Boucher, 144 CONG. REC. 7097 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998)).
The anticircumvention provisions are enforced through § 1203,
which provides an express cause of action in federal court for any
person “injured by a violation” of § 1201.67 The complaining party
may elect to receive either the sum of the actual damages it suffered
and the additional profits earned by the violator, or statutory
damages.68 Furthermore, § 1204 imposes criminal sanctions up to
a maximum $500,000 fine and five-year imprisonment for any
§ 1201 violation; the penalty is doubled for a second violation.69
Copyright scholars characterize the anticircumvention rule,70
detailed in § 1201, as a “paradigm shift” away from a three-century-
old focus on the activities of individuals who make unauthorized
copies.71 Replacing this tradition is a new emphasis on liability
for those who provide the technology for overcoming TPMs and
thus make possible unauthorized copying by individuals.72 A few
exceptions persist: hacking into TPMs is permitted for conducting
encryption research,73 assessing product interoperability,74 and
testing computer security systems.75 In addition, the DMCA
provides nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions
with exemptions from anticircumvention provisions under narrow
circumstances akin to a short-lived “shopping privilege.”76 
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77. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2000).
78. DRATLER & MCJOHN, supra note 64, at 2-87.
79. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 673, 723 (2000).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
After laying out the anticircumvention rule, the DMCA states in
just one sentence that “[n]othing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, in-
cluding fair use ....”77 Nevertheless, in response to the question of
how § 1201’s anticircumvention rule has practically impacted the
traditional fair use defense and other public interest “safety valves”
of copyright law, intellectual property scholar Jay Dratler sum-
marily responds: “The answer is simple: it obliterates them all.”78
Although this is perhaps a somewhat extreme interpretation,
many copyright gurus consider Dratler’s response to be an accurate
reading of the anticircumvention rule. David Nimmer, for example,
has similarly concluded that “there is no such thing as a section 107
fair use defense to a charge of a section 1201 violation.”79 According
to this view, because the fair use doctrine is a defense only to a
claim of infringement, a defendant is liable for any violation of the
anticircumvention or antitrafficking rules of the DMCA regardless
of whether there is any infringement at all. If so interpreted by the
courts, the DMCA indeed obliterates the fair use defense.
B. The Judiciary’s Treatment of Fair Use, Liability, and Emerging
Technologies Prior to the DMCA 
Because much of the concern regarding the dangers of the DMCA
involves its impact on the fair use defense to copyright liability, a
brief overview of the doctrine is in order. Fair use serves as an af-
firmative defense to a copyright infringement action and embodies
the notion that the public should be allowed access to protected
materials for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching ... scholarship, or research” without risk of liability.80 For
example, when a professor photocopies part of a copyrighted law
review article for one-time distribution to her class without seeking
the permission of the author, her “infringement” is protected
because courts and public policy decision makers have long recog-
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81. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 158-59 (2004).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994) (noting that “fair
use remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act”).
85. See NIMMER, supra note 59, §§ 13-155 to 13-156 (“The Copyright Act of 1976 was ...
‘intended to restate the present [i.e., pre-1978] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change,
narrow, or enlarge it in any way.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976))); see also id.
§ 13-156 n.7 (“‘The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright Act of
1976 reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common-law doctrine.’” (quoting Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985))).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
87. Id.; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (“The factors enumerated in the section
are not meant to be exclusive ....”); Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578 (“Nor may the four statutory
nized the educational importance of such uses.81 Further, her use is
not likely to come at the financial expense of the author—i.e., it is
probably not the case that students would have purchased the
article on their own had the professor not handed out the excerpt for
free because they would not have known of the article’s existence
otherwise. Similarly, a journalist who quotes portions of a book or
movie in writing a review for her newspaper is held to have a fair
use defense against copyright infringement.82 Her review provides
valuable information about the copyrighted work without depriving
the copyright holder of the financial gain associated with the sale of
her product.83 In fact, the journalist’s fair use often positively
contributes to the financial value of the underlying work, making it
counterproductive for the author to pursue an infringement action
at all.
Although a judicially created doctrine,84 Congress codified the fair
use defense in § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act.85 Section 107
enunciates four factors to aid courts in determining whether the use
of a protected work constitutes fair use.86 The court’s inquiry must
include, but is not limited to:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.87 
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factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”). 
88. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
89. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
90. The Betamax technology is nearly identical to the familiar Video Cassette Recorder
(VCR) technology, the longer-lived market competitor.
91. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
92. Id. at 420, 434. Contributory infringement was premised on the notion that without
Sony’s product, individual users would not have been able to infringe on Universal’s and
Disney’s copyright. Id. Sony’s product made their allegedly unlawful actions possible. 
93. Id. at 435 (“For vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the
concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying
the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another.”).
94. Id. at 433-34.
In short, the fair use defense “‘permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’”88
The fair use defense set the backdrop for the landmark 1984
intellectual property case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.89 In Sony, the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for
whether parties would be found contributorily liable when they
furnished the means or machinery capable of allowing copyright
infringement. The technology at issue in Sony was the now infa-
mous Betamax video tape recorder,90 which made it possible for
members of the general public to copy a protected work in order to
“time shift”—i.e., record a copyrighted television show during the
day and watch it at a later time, when more convenient to the
user.91 Rather than pursuing actions against individual Betamax
users, copyright holders Universal Studios and Walt Disney sued
Betamax manufacturer Sony directly, arguing that Sony should be
liable under a theory of contributory infringement under the federal
Copyright Act of 1976.92 
Although the Copyright Act did not provide express guidance for
liability of one party for another’s infringing action, the Supreme
Court had no difficulty considering the potential for such claims.93
Thus, if Universal and Disney could prove that the consumer’s
Betamax use fell outside the fair use defense94 and that Sony had
constructive knowledge that its product would induce its customers
to infringe on other innovators’ copyrights, Sony would be vicari-
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95. Id. at 439.
96. Id. at 440.
97. Id. at 442.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 456.
100. See NIMMER, supra note 59, at 12A-10 to §§ 12A-11 (noting that this open-ended
question of what is commercially significant led to the DMCA amendments targeting
manufacturers of products that could be used for copyright infringement purposes). 
101. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 446.
104. Id. at 445-48.
105. Id. at 445 n.27. Mr. Rogers’s testimony was recounted by the Court at great length:
“I am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in broadcasting has
ously liable.95 Borrowing from patent law, the Court reasoned,
however, that in those instances in which a charge of contributory
infringement rests entirely on the sale of a commercial good, the
public interest in access to such a product is “necessarily impli-
cated.”96 Accordingly, the Court articulated a balancing test to weigh
the copyright owner’s “legitimate demand for effective—not merely
symbolic—protection of the statutory [copyright] monopoly” with the
rights of the public to “engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce.”97 As with patented works, the Court reasoned that if a
product is used for other “legitimate, unobjectionable purposes,” the
manufacturer is not liable for another’s infringement.98 Because the
private, home use of Betamax recorders fell well within such
“substantial noninfringing uses,” the Court held that Sony was not
liable for contributory infringement.99 
To be sure, the Court declined to say how much use was required
to constitute a commercially significant noninfringing use.100
Regardless, consumers’ private noncommercial time-shifting in their
own homes “plainly satisfie[d] this standard.”101 The Court sup-
ported its conclusion on two grounds.102 First, a finding of contribu-
tory liability against Sony would “frustrate the interests of broad-
casters” who wanted to reach time-shifting audiences.103 The Court
noted the relatively small percentage of the market represented by
the copyright owners Universal and Disney compared to the
potentially large number of copyright holders who welcomed
audiences’ time-shifting practice.104 In fact, no less of a venerable
child-icon (and valuable copyright holder) than Mr. Rogers himself
offered testimony in support of Sony.105 Hence, it was patently
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always been ‘You are an important person just the way you are.’” Id.
106. Id. at 445-46. 
107. Id. at 454.
108. Id. at 454-55.
109. Id. Of course, one could imagine that the practice of time-shifting might potentially
reduce the revenues of copyright holders like Universal and Disney. If television and movie
studios’ income is dependent on commercial advertising, and Sony’s Betamax users record
shows in order to fast forward through the commercials while viewing them later, then
advertising revenues could indeed decline. Without evidence in support of this theory,
however, this potential harm is speculative and does not justify overriding critical fair use
principles aimed at effectuating the public interest. Cf. Louise Story, Viewers Fast-
Forwarding Past Ads? Not Alway [sic], N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at A1 (observing that users
of digital video recorders do not skip through as many advertisements as advertisers fear).
Moreover, it is quite possible that Universal and Sony knew that they were not suffering
substantial pecuniary harm from the practice of time-shifting, but filed the suit in order to
extract a settlement from Sony.
110. (Galoob II), 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
111. Id. at 967.
112. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. (Galoob I), 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1286
(N.D. Cal. 1991). Galoob Toys filed the original complaint seeking declaratory judgment that
the Genie did not violate Nintendo’s copyrights; Nintendo subsequently sued for injunctive
relief. The case name reflects this sequence. Id.
evident that Universal and Disney did not represent the entire class
of copyright owners.106 Second, when up against the doctrine of fair
use, copyright owners must show some “likelihood of harm” before
a private act is condemned.107 The Court reasoned that Universal
and Disney failed to demonstrate more than a de minimus harm to
their potential market—whether measured by the alleged loss of
accounting in real-time ratings or reduced re-run viewership.108
Thus, the act of time-shifting was perfectly lawful and squarely
within the public interest and fair use defense.109
The Sony Court’s “substantial noninfringing use test” provided
needed flexibility in assessing new technologies in light of fair use
concerns and contributory infringement claims. The doctrine was
put to the test a few years later in the video game context in the
case of Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.110
Galoob marketed a new technology, known as the “Game Genie,”
which allowed home-users to temporarily alter aspects of copy-
righted videogames—for example, by increasing the number of
“lives” of the game’s protagonist.111 Copyright owner Nintendo sued
Galoob on the basis of contributory infringement and on the theory
that the Genie constituted a “derivative work” under the Copyright
Act.112 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the
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113. Galoob II, 964 F.2d at 968.
114. Id. at 972.
115. Galoob I, 780 F. Supp. at 1292.
116. Id. at 1298.
117. Galoob II, 964 F.2d at 970, 972 (emphasis added).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000) (“Nothing in this section shall affect ... defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use ....”). The “fair use” doctrine was codified as part
of the Copyright Act of 1976. Id. § 107 (“Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use”). See supra
note 77 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B. 
derivative work claim, finding that the Game Genie’s enhancement
of Nintendo’s audiovisual displays “do[es] not incorporate a portion
of a copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent form.”113 More
importantly, the Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that even if the Game Genie was a derivative work, the
fair use defense exempted Galoob from liability.114 Just as the Sony
Court examined the fair use of Betamax customers, the district
court in Galoob focused on the “fairness of the family’s use of its
video game, not some evaluation of the commercial ‘fairness’ of
Galoob’s product.”115 Because home users of the Game Genie would
not be directly liable for using the accessory under the fair use
defense, Galoob could not be held contributorily liable.116 The Ninth
Circuit expressly validated the district court’s focus “on whether
consumers who purchase and use the Game Genie would be
infringing Nintendo’s copyrights” and affirmed its finding of no
contributory liability.117
Thus, after Sony and Galoob, the fair use doctrine had become a
strong and vibrant defense protecting the public’s interest against
the competing claims of copyright owners.
C. The Post-DMCA Landscape: The Death of Sony, the Failure of
Constitutional Challenges, and the Dangerously Expanding
Definition of TPMs 
While the pre-DMCA jurisprudence regarding fair use thus
seemed well-settled in intellectual property and judicial circles,
early post-DMCA interpretation of § 1201 dramatically altered the
playing field. To be sure, § 1201 expressly reassures the reader that
the fair use defense to copyright infringement is still alive and
well.118 Nevertheless, the new anticircumvention rule for some time
seemed incompatible with the old fair use doctrine, as federal
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119. See United States v. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1122-25 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Robert P. Taylor
& Ethan B. Andelman, Anticircumvention Under the DMCA: Where Do We Stand After Five
Years?, 764 PLI/Pat. 101, 111, n.49 (2003) (citing RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No.
2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at **7-8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000)). 
120. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323; RealNetworks,
2000 WL 127311, at *6.
121. See, e.g., Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 330, 339.
courts—contrary to congressional intent and prior common
law—soundly rejected this defense when faced with new technolo-
gies designed to circumvent TPMs. In addition, the courts soundly
defeated a variety of constitutional challenges to the DMCA, in-
cluding those based on the First Amendment. Particularly alarming
was the courts’ substantial broadening of the definition of a
TPM—so much so that the DMCA threatened to create perpetual
patent-like protection at the expense of public access and innova-
tion.
1. The DMCA’s Anticircumvention Rule Meets Sony and the
Fair Use Doctrine
In the first few years following enactment of the DMCA, defen-
dant circumventors analogized their products and customers to
Sony’s Betamax and its users. Defendants and their attorneys
eagerly offered up the Sony test and the related fair use defense to
protect their new products and technologies, which had the potential
to overcome TPMs and provide access to otherwise protected
works.119 Yet, despite Congress’s stated intent to leave the fair use
doctrine intact and the Sony test for contributory infringement
undisturbed, courts rejected their application in the circumvention
context in the post-DMCA world. Instead, courts interpreted the
new § 1201 liability regime as wholly distinct from infringement
liability to which the fair use defense applied.120 Given the inde-
pendent cause of action written into § 1203 of the DMCA, courts
bifurcated copyright infringement liability from § 1201 claims,
granting injunctive relief for circumvention alone, regardless of
whether direct or contributory infringement was even shown.
Furthermore, courts have upheld the constitutionality of the DMCA,
finding it consistent with the constraints of the Copyright Clause,
the First Amendment, and Due Process.121
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122. 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
123. Id. at 981.
124. Id.
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 988.
127. Id. at 987-88.
128. While we believe this to be a fair reading of the case, the court did not directly address
Sony or fair use as a defense to a § 1201 violation. Rather, what is notable is the way that the
court approached the case. The fact that it treated § 1201 separately from the infringement
claim sets the stage for the analysis offered in RealNetworks and Reimerdes, infra notes 131-
55 and accompanying text.
129. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 986-87. Indeed, the court found insufficient evidence
on which to grant an injunction for contributory infringement liability. Id. at 989.
130. An unpublished decision shortly thereafter similarly upheld injunctive relief based in
part on § 1201. CSC Holdings Inc. v. Greenleaf Elecs., No. 99C7249, 2000 WL 715601, *6, *9
The first chink in the Sony and fair use armor came at the hands
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in
Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Gamemasters.122 The
court was tasked with interpreting the one-year-old DMCA under
a set of facts strikingly similar to those that the court faced in
Galoob. The technology at issue, known as the “Game Enhancer,”
enabled players to modify the rules of Sony’s PlayStation.123 For
example, one might give extra lives to the main character, just like
the Game Genie allowed in Galoob.124 Gamemasters’ Enhancer also
enabled users to play games in any location regardless of the game’s
territory code—e.g., allowing users to play Japanese games on a
U.S. console.125 Contrary to the overwhelming weight of pre-DMCA
case law, the district court awarded a preliminary injunction to the
plaintiff, Sony.126 Specifically, the court found that Gamemasters
violated § 1201 of the DMCA because it sold—and thus, traf-
ficked—the Enhancer, a technology whose primary function, the
court reasoned, was to circumvent the console’s territory code
mechanism, which was presumed to be a TPM.127 Despite the fact
that the Enhancer did not permanently alter copyrighted works nor
allow for the operation of counterfeit games, and regardless of the
other legitimate uses of the product, the court found that liability
existed separately under the new § 1201 anticircumvention rule.128
Gamemasters, then, was liable under § 1201 for the naked act of
selling the Enhancer product—irrespective of whether plaintiffs
could show actual copyright infringement.129 A paradigm shift had
indeed occurred.130
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(N.D. Ill. June 1, 2000) (holding that the use of a black box designed to decode scrambled cable
television signals violated § 1201 of the DMCA in addition to other federal laws applicable to
cable television). 
131. No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id. at **2-3.
135. Id. at *4.
136. Id. at *10.
137. Id. at *8.
138. Id.
Following Gamemasters, three district courts had the occasion to
directly consider whether the fair use defense held any relevance in
the anticircumvention context—and all three answered in the
negative. In the unpublished decision of RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc.,131 the District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted injunctive relief under the DMCA to plaintiff
RealNetworks.132 Defendant Streambox distributed and marketed
a device that allowed consumers to manipulate the security mea-
sures protecting RealNetworks’ “streaming” software.133 Specifically,
RealNetworks employed two TPMs—the “Secret Handshake,” an
access control, and the “Copy Switch,” a copy protection mea-
sure—to ensure that media files being streamed to the user would
“evaporate” once played.134 By using the Streambox device, however,
consumers were able to bypass the TPMs and thus to download and
save the streamed media files.135 Emphasizing the possible financial
loss to RealNetworks if current and potential client copyright
holders lost faith in the company’s TPMs, the court easily held that
the plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable harm.136 In contrast to
copyright holders like Mr. Rogers in Sony, the court found that the
copyright owners that employ streaming technology make clear that
they do not want their works copied.137 The court therefore con-
cluded that even though a consumer’s use of the Streambox device
enabled noninfringing uses—e.g., downloading files for subsequent,
private “fair use” of the work—the fair use exception provided no
shield for defendants, as it arguably would have under the contribu-
tory liability scheme of Sony.138 Thus, the court summarized:
“‘Equipment manufacturers in the twenty-first century will need to
vet their products for compliance with section 1201 in order to avoid
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139. Id. (quoting NIMMER, supra note 59, § 12A.18[B]).
140. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d
sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the
constitutionality of the DMCA on challenge by defendant Corley from the district court); 321
Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089-90 (N.D. Cal.
2004). Indeed, 321 Studios has ceased its business operations as a result of injunctions issued
under the DMCA. See John Borland, DVD-Copying Trailblazer Shuts its Doors, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 3, 2004, http://www.news.com/dvd-copying-trailblazer-shuts-its-doors/2100-
1025_3-5295913.html.
141. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
142. Id. at 308-09.
143. Id. at 303, 308.
144. Id. at 303.
145. Id. at 311.
146. Id. at 316-17.
a circumvention claim, rather than under Sony to negate a copy-
right claim.’”139
Next, DVD-copying programs, perhaps the Betamax recorders of
today, also failed to withstand early DMCA challenges, with courts
acknowledging the legitimate and lawful end-uses of such products,
but nevertheless enjoining their manufacture and sale.140 In 2001,
notorious hacker Eric Corley raised the Sony test and fair use
defense before the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of
New York with no success in the case of Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Reimerdes.141 Corley, who goes by the name of George Orwell’s
1984 underground leader, Emmanuel Goldstein, had posted on his
company’s website the source and object code for decryption
software in order to aid viewers in copying DVDs.142 That software,
known as DeCSS, allowed users to overcome a TPM, known as the
“Content Scramble System” (CSS), encoded on DVDs.143 DVDs are
otherwise viewed only on players and computers equipped with
technology that permits decryption of the CSS but does not allow
users to copy the movie.144 DeCSS was originally created by a
Norwegian teen who reverse engineered a licensed DVD player and
cracked the CSS algorithm.145 
Finding that DeCSS was designed for the purpose of circumvent-
ing a TPM and that defendants provided DeCSS links and instruc-
tions on their website, the court determined that plaintiffs made a
prima facie showing of a § 1201(a)(2) antitrafficking violation and
were entitled to injunctive relief.146 That DeCSS decrypted the files
with such high quality and convenience made the injury to plaintiffs
374 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:349
147. Id. at 313-14. The court here also considers that DeCSS could be used in tandem with
“DivX” to compress the file, allowing it to be burned to a CD. The court also notes the
increased speed of downloading: “Student rooms in many universities are equipped with
network connections rated at 10 megabits per second.” Id. at 314. 
148. Id. at 320.
149. Id. DeCSS also enabled users of Linux systems (as opposed to Windows systems) to
access CSS-encrypted DVDs where such access had been previously unavailable. See Amy
Harmon, Judges Weigh Copyright Suit on Unlocking DVD Shield, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001,
at C4.
150. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
151. Id. at 314 (“At trial defendants repeated, as if it were a mantra, the refrain that
plaintiffs ... have no direct evidence of a specific occasion on which any person decrypted a
copyrighted motion picture with DeCSS .... But that is unpersuasive.”).
152. Id. at 304.
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 322.
that much more compelling.147 Additionally, even though DeCSS
was created through reverse engineering, an activity for which the
DMCA provides an exemption, the court rejected the argument as
applicable to the Norwegian teen, not Corley and his company.148
Even if Corley himself had performed the reverse engineering,
however, to fit within the exemption he would have had to develop
DeCSS with the “sole” purpose of achieving interoperability; the fact
that one of the DeCSS uses was for such an end did not merit an
exemption.149 
In response to Corley’s assertion that the Sony test for determin-
ing liability applied, the district court responded that “to the extent
of any inconsistency between Sony and the new [DMCA] statute,”
Sony is overruled.150 The court reasoned that while some techno-
logy could pass the Sony test, that same technology could now be
suppressed independently under § 1201 regardless of whether
infringement had occurred.151 Corley also argued, and the court
agreed, that CSS blocked “fair uses of copyrighted works as well as
foul.”152 Nevertheless, the court recognized this argument as the
precise contention that surfaced and failed in debates leading up to
enactment of the DMCA; the tension produced, the court reasoned,
was Congress’s compromise, even if not ideal.153 For example, the
court noted that a film studies professor would be unable, without
decrypting the CSS, to make fair use of DVDs by copying and
splicing together segments of DVD movie scenes to show to her
class.154 Still, “[t]he fact that Congress elected to leave technologi-
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cally unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of en-
crypted copyrighted works without the technical means of doing so
is a matter for Congress.”155 That is, while the same film studies
professor would be protected from infringement liability as an
exercise of fair use, under the DMCA no one can legally sell her the
technology to do so, save for a home video recorder or other rudi-
mentary copying device.
321 Studios, another maker of DVD copying software like that
of Corley’s company, went on the offensive and filed a complaint
for declaratory relief.156 Specifically, 321 sought a declaration that
its products did not violate § 1201 of the DMCA or, alternatively,
that the DMCA violates the U.S. Constitution under the First
Amendment insofar as Congress overreached its Article I powers in
enacting the anticircumvention rule.157 Defendants included owners
of motion picture copyrights and DVD producers and distributors as
well as the United States, which intervened as to the claim chal-
lenging the constitutional validity of the DMCA.158 Lifting para-
graphs wholesale from the Southern District of New York opinion
in Reimerdes,159 the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of
California held in 321 Studios that 321’s copying software was
primarily designed to circumvent CSS-protected DVDs, a violation
of the anticircumvention rule, and thus granted defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.160 
As in Reimerdes, 321 advanced the argument that consumers’
uses of its product triggered fair use rights and thus 321’s products
did not violate the DMCA.161 Indeed, consumers employed the
copying software on “original DVDs” that they had purchased in
order to make personal backup copies of movies, whether encrypted
with CSS or not.162 Rejecting the fair use argument, the court stated:
“the downstream uses of the software by the customers of 321,
whether legal or illegal, are not relevant to determining whether
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321 itself is violating the statute.”163 Likewise, the court rejected any
consideration of other legitimate uses of the product and instead
reasoned that 321’s admission that its software circumvents CSS is
enough to render 321 liable.164
2. The DMCA Meets (and Defeats) Constitutional Challenges
While the early post-DMCA case law detailed above signaled the
death knell for Sony’s fair use doctrine in actions brought under the
DMCA, opponents had not given up hope of challenge on constitu-
tional grounds. Unfortunately, federal courts have now upheld the
DMCA’s anticircumvention rule as constitutional multiple times,
using several different lines of analysis.165 
The breadth of activities and products deemed illegal under the
DMCA indicates an uphill battle in raising as-applied constitu-
tional challenges. In 321 Studios, for example, the district court
easily rejected a First Amendment claim that the DMCA violated
321’s free speech by prohibiting the company from mere marketing
of products boasting circumvention capability.166 That is, once it
determined that 321’s products violated the DMCA, the district
court reasoned that 321’s commercial speech would constitute
illegal activity and thus could not be afforded First Amendment
protection.167 
Similarly, on appeal following the district court decision in
Reimerdes, defendant Corley challenged the Act as an unlawful
restriction of his company’s free speech in that it prohibited Corley
from disseminating DeCSS.168 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s ruling, holding that although computer code qualified as
“speech,” it nonetheless could be regulated under the content-
neutral DMCA.169 The court reasoned that the DMCA served a
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substantial government interest in preventing unauthorized access
to protected works.170 Regardless of other less restrictive means of
achieving such an end, the prohibition satisfied judicial scrutiny.171
321 also failed under the intermediate scrutiny standard of review
as the court found that any free speech restrictions were “incidental”
and no greater than the substantial government interests related to
protecting copyrights and intellectual property.172 
Likewise, defendant ElcomSoft—in the sole criminal case under
the DMCA—challenged its indictment on as-applied First Amend-
ment grounds in United States v. Elcom.173 ElcomSoft’s employee
Dmitry Skylarov had written a program that could unlock Adobe
Acrobat’s eBooks and PDF files, turning the works into “naked” files
to enable users to engage in fair use of the products, for example, by
printing portions of the book or making a back-up copy.174 Despite
the fact that a third party end-user—just like the film professor
exemplified in Reimerdes—could use the ElcomSoft product for a
legal, noninfringing use, ElcomSoft was indicted for selling the
product because it could be used to overcome Adobe’s use-restric-
tions (a TPM) in violation of § 1201(b).175 Challenging its indictment,
ElcomSoft argued that the DMCA’s antitrafficking measure, as
applied, was not sufficiently tailored to meet the government’s
interest.176 The court rejected this claim, citing the government’s
aim to preserve the rights of copyright holders, encourage e-com-
merce, and prevent piracy.177 
Facial challenges to the DMCA on the ground that it im-
permissibly burdens third-party speech have likewise failed. For
example, the Elcom court rejected ElcomSoft’s facial challenge to
the statute as overbroad in its restriction of third party speech,
citing the defendant’s inability to establish a “realistic danger” that
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speech would be significantly compromised.178 The court reasoned
that even though fair users might have more difficulty engaging
in certain uses of electronic books, “[t]here has certainly been no
generally recognized First Amendment right to make back-up
copies.”179 Using similar logic, the district court in 321 Studios,
responding to a facial challenge asserted by 321 that the DMCA
burdened the fair use rights of users, stated that “although ...
copying will not be as easy, as exact, or as digitally manipulable as
plaintiff desires,” it is nonetheless a permissible burden on third
party speech.180
In Elcom, ElcomSoft also argued that the DMCA was void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause.181 Citing legislative
history and the language of the DMCA, ElcomSoft argued that
Congress intended only to prevent the act of circumventing use-
control TPMs where infringement results—not to ban all tools that
could be used to circumvent TPMs.182 From this premise, ElcomSoft
argued that § 1201(b) was vague in that it did not clearly define
which tools were banned.183 The court, however, accepted the
government’s response that Congress’s end result was clear in that
it placed an across-the-board prohibition on any provision of
circumvention tools, regardless of whether such tools facilitate
infringement or enable fair use.184 The court noted, “[d]efendant
relies heavily on congressional intent to preserve fair use but that
congressional intent does not change the analysis.”185 The court
concluded that no inconsistency existed between fair use and the
trafficking ban.186 Moreover, the ban was “part of the sacrifice
Congress was willing to make” in enacting the DMCA.187
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Finally, parties have challenged the underlying constitutional
authority under which Congress enacted the DMCA.188 In Elcom, for
example, ElcomSoft argued that in using its Commerce Clause
authority to legislate the particulars of selling certain technologies,
Congress ran afoul of the fair use protections afforded under the
Intellectual Property (IP) Clause.189 The court, however—without
citation to authority—reasoned that the trafficking ban was
consistent with the aim of the IP Clause to promote the useful arts
and sciences.190 As if good intentions carry the day legally, the court
noted that Congress sought to preserve fair use and thus, the DMCA
could not be fundamentally inconsistent with the IP Clause.191
Further, even for those works where the copyright has expired and
a perpetual TPM continues to control a consumer’s use of the work,
the DMCA is not inconsistent with the IP Clause. The court
reasoned as follows: “At best, the publisher has a technological
measure embedded within the digital product precluding certain
uses of that ... work and, in many cases, the user/purchaser has
acquiesced in this restriction when purchasing/licensing the
work.”192 That is, consumers could simply pay extra for fair use
rights guaranteed to them by common law. Hence, the DMCA was
found to be both consistent with the IP Clause and with Congress’s
constitutional authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause.193
3. The Scope of the DMCA Today: How Broad is a TPM?
Given the apparent obsolescence of the fair use defense and Sony
rationale, the emphasis shifted in DMCA cases to the issue of what
is included—and what might be perpetually protected—under the
definition of TPMs.194 Federal district courts again sided with
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197. Lexmark I, 253 F. Supp. 2d 943.
198. Pearl Investments, 257 F. Supp. 2d 326.
199. Id. at 349-50.
200. Id. at 349.
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202. Id. at 335.
203. Id. at 351. Chunn’s activity was first discovered when Pearl’s request to have the
Linux operating system installed on its off-site server instead resulted in that software’s
installation on Chunn’s server. Id. at 341-42. The installation overwrote the hard drive on
Chunn’s server and thus destroyed any programming code stored therein. Id. at 343. The
court granted summary judgment to Chunn on the copyright issue in part because “in the
industries that use TPMs to control access and use of protected
works, finding irreparable financial harm should those industries
have to face diminished potency of TPMs and the corollary of that
diminished potency: increased competition195 and increased con-
sumer access, whether “fair” or not.196 To that end, courts deemed a
seemingly broad category of products—from printer cartridge
microchips197 to password-protected networks198—as constituting
TPMs afforded perpetual protection by the anticircumvention rules.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine observed in Pearl
Investments, LLC v. Standard I/O, Inc. that whether the DMCA
protects password-protected networks constituted a question of
first impression—but “not a difficult one.”199 Pearl sued Jesse Chunn
and his company, Standard, for the act of circumvention under
§ 1201(a)(1)(A).200 Chunn allegedly “tunneled” into Pearl’s virtual
private network (VPN), where he was able to gain access to a
copyrighted stock-trading computer system, among other pro-
grams.201 Chunn himself had previously developed software for
Pearl to enable the automated private stock-trading system,
generating significant revenue independent of the public stock
market.202 Despite granting summary judgment to Chunn on the
plaintiff’s copyright infringement claims,203 the court refused to
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grant Chunn summary judgment on the plaintiff’s DMCA claim.204
Rather, the court found the mere act of accessing without permis-
sion a VPN that hosted a copyrighted stock-trading system to
constitute “the electronic equivalent of breaking into a locked room
in order to obtain a copy of a book.”205 Applying that analogy, a
password-protected network became a TPM under the DMCA.
The definition of a TPM as it relates to the antitrafficking rules
likewise received liberal interpretation in Lexmark International,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.206 There, printer manufactur-
ing giant Lexmark sued Static Control Components (SCC) for
trafficking in a component that could circumvent Lexmark’s au-
thentication sequence to allow a less-expensive SCC toner cartridge
to operate with a Lexmark printer.207 Lexmark sold printer car-
tridges with an up-front discount by conditioning the savings on a
user’s future return of used cartridges to Lexmark.208 In addition to
placing a “shrink-wrap” contract on the packaging of every such
printer cartridge,209 Lexmark enforced this arrangement by devel-
oping an authentication sequence that made incompatible any use
of a competitor’s toner cartridge in a Lexmark machine.210 The U.S.
District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky deemed the
authentication sequence itself to be a TPM because it effectively
controlled access to copyrighted printer programs required for
various printer operations and for monitoring cartridge ink levels.211
Because SCC marketed and sold cartridges that could mimic the
sequence and become operable in Lexmark printers,212 Lexmark was
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likely to prevail under the DMCA’s antitrafficking provision.213
Finding that SCC had failed to rebut the presumption of irreparable
harm stemming from a DMCA violation, the court granted Lexmark
injunctive relief.214 In so doing, the court also noted that even in the
absence of this presumption, Lexmark had established irreparable
harm based on the time and money that Lexmark had invested
developing the printer software programs and, more notably, the
possibility of “a multitude of harms” related to customer goodwill.215
In ruling for Lexmark, the court rejected SCC’s public policy
argument that its product—and, presumably, the products of other
companies similarly situated—would increase competition and thus
benefit consumers.216 Unfortunately for SCC, the court held that any
competition that violated the DMCA was per se illegitimate.217
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION ATTEMPTING TO REIN IN THE DANGERS
OF THE DMCA
Concerned with the DMCA’s impact on consumers, members of
Congress have proposed various changes to the Act. These proposals
focus particularly on alleviating the unintended liability of consum-
ers under § 1201(a)(1), which outlaws the act of circumventing a
TPM.218 By comparison, congressional members have not been as
ambitious in redrafting the antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA
contained within § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1), which make it unlawful for
manufacturers to provide the means for consumers to access or
make fair use of TPM-protected works.219 Notably, proposals to
change the circumvention and trafficking rules of the DMCA have
yet to be considered for a vote on either floor of Congress. 
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A. Protecting the Fair Use Rights of Consumers and the       
Manufacturers Who Make Possible the Exercise of Consumers’
Fair Use Rights 
1.The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act
In joint remarks, Representatives Rick Boucher and John
Doolittle outlined their concern regarding the evolution of DMCA
jurisprudence when they introduced the Digital Media Consumers’
Rights Act (DMCRA)220 in 2002 and again upon reintroducing the
bill in 2003.221 Representatives Boucher and Doolittle characterized
the DMCA as “tilt[ing] the balance in our copyright laws too heavily
in favor of the interests of copyright owners and undermin[ing] the
longstanding fair use rights of information consumers ....”222 The
remarks highlighted the essential nature of the fair use doctrine to
the exercise of First Amendment rights: “the very vibrancy of our
democracy is dependent on the information availability and use
facilitated by the fair use doctrine.”223 Summarizing their concern,
the Representatives stated: 
[W]hat is now available for free on library shelves will only be
available on a “pay per use” basis.... Even the student who wants
the most basic access to only a portion of an electronic book to
write a term paper would have to pay. The DMCA places the
force of law behind these technical barriers by making it a crime
to circumvent them even to exercise fair use rights. The day is
already here in which copyright owners use “click on,” “click
through,” and “shrink wrap” licenses to limit what purchasers
of a copyrighted work may do with it. Some go so far as to make
it a violation of the license to even criticize the contents of a
work, let alone to make a copy of a paragraph or two.224
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To protect consumers seeking to make fair use of TPM-protected
works, Representatives Boucher and Doolittle introduced the
DMCRA with hopes of guaranteeing that “existing copy protection
measures [would be] implemented in ways that respect consumers’
customary practices and ensur[e] that, as future technologies are
developed, they incorporate means by which fair use of content can
be made.”225
As reintroduced most recently in 2005, the DMCRA amends the
“savings clause” of the DMCA, which specifies that the Act does not
affect the fair use defense, to make clear that it is not a violation of
§ 1201(a)(1) to circumvent a TPM in order to gain access to or use a
copyrighted work if the circumvention does not result in an
infringement of that work.226 Recognizing that fair use of a TPM-
protected work cannot be effected if a consumer lacks the technolog-
ical means to bypass the TPM and thus access the work, the
DMCRA also adds a new paragraph providing that: “Except in
instances of direct infringement, it shall not be a violation of the
Copyright Act to manufacture or distribute a hardware or software
product capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”227 This amend-
ment would, for example, allow a manufacturer to create software
enabling a consumer to listen to an audio form of the electronic book
that she has legitimately purchased.228 In short, the DMCRA’s
amendment to § 1201(a)(2) would shepherd in a return to Sony, with
its focus on the fair use rights of consumers and the noninfringing
uses of useful, emerging technologies.229 
Following its 2005 reintroduction to the House, the DMCRA was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary as well as to the
Committee on Energy and Commerce. It was subsequently referred
to the latter’s Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
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Protection. In 2007, however, Representatives Boucher and Doolittle
instead opted to cosponsor the FAIR USE Act.230
2. The BALANCE Act of 2003 
The Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net
Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003 was introduced by
Representative Zoe Lofgren in 2003 and again in 2005.231 At the
time of its 2003 proposal, Representative Lofgren remarked that the
DMCA was enacted in response to “a massive digital revolution”
which “provoked deep concern and suspicion within the entertain-
ment industry.”232 Calling the law flawed, Representative Lofgren
expressed fear that the DMCA now threatens fair use, the first sale
doctrine, and the First Amendment.233 Moreover, pointing to the
district court’s opinion in Lexmark as an example, Representative
Lofgren argued that the DMCA has inadvertently chilled technologi-
cal development, competition, and future innovation.234 
The BALANCE Act attempted to restore the traditional give-and-
take of copyright law by proposing changes aimed at respecting both
developers’ and users’ rights. First, section 3 of the Act serves to
protect fair use and consumer expectations in the digital world by
amending the first sentence of section 107 of the Copyright Act to
allow fair use through digital transmission.235 Further, new § 123
would be added, providing for limitations on exclusive rights and
permissible uses of digital works.236 Next, section 4 of the BAL-
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ANCE Act extends the first sale doctrine, which traditionally
terminates the right of a copyright owner to control further sale or
disposition of a lawfully transferred copy of a copyrighted work, to
certain digital works.237 Finally, in amending § 1201, section 5 of the
BALANCE Act defines circumstances that if satisfied would render
permissible not only circumvention that enables fair use, but also
the “manufacture, import, offer[ing] to the public, provi[sion], or
otherwise mak[ing] available [of] technological means to circum-
vent” an access-restricting TPM.238 In particular, the BALANCE Act
predicates absence of liability for either act on: (1) its being
“necessary to make a noninfringing use” of the work; and (2) “the
copyright owner fail[ing] to make publicly available the necessary
means to make such noninfringing use without additional cost or
burden to” the legitimate user.239 
No action on the BALANCE Act has been taken since its referral
to the Committee on the Judiciary in 2005. Most recently, Represen-
tative Lofgren joined Representatives Boucher and Doolittle in co-
sponsoring the FAIR USE Act of 2007.240
B. Clarifying Consumers’ Fair Use Rights in the Digital World
1. The FAIR USE Act of 2007
Apparently yielding to pressure from copyright holders, Represen-
tatives Boucher, Doolittle, and Lofgren recently retreated from
creating a fair use defense to the DMCA’s anticircumvention and
antitrafficking provisions. Upon introducing the Freedom and
Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship (FAIR USE) Act of
2007,241 Representative Boucher pointedly noted: “I continue to
believe that there should be [a fair use defense to the act of
circumvention] in the law, but content owners have expressed
concern that enactment of such a provision could lead to widespread
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redistribution of audiovisual and other works.”242 Accordingly, the
FAIR USE Act protects consumers from § 1201(a)(1) liability only
insofar as it exempts circumvention engaged in for the following
purposes: (1) to compile excerpts of audiovisual works for libraries
or educational use; (2) to avoid commercial or objectionable audiovi-
sual content; (3) to transmit works over a personal network, so long
as the circumvented TPM does not prevent “mass, indiscriminate
redistribution” via uploading to the Internet; (4) to access a work in
the public domain that is itself included in a compilation primarily
of works in the public domain; (5) to access for criticism, comment,
journalism, scholarship, or research a work that is of substantial
public interest; and (6) to preserve or replace works in library and
archival collections.243 Consumer circumvention of TPMs protecting
certain types of works identified by the Librarian of Congress is also
exempted from liability.244 By contrast, no exemptions would be
created for those who make devices to circumvent TPMs available
to consumers, even if used only for these enumerated purposes.
Although it does not provide relief from liability under
§ 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1), the FAIR USE Act does limit statutory
damages for contributory infringement.245 In introducing the Act,
Representative Boucher explained that under current law, “statu-
tory damages can be so large and disproportionate that entrepre-
neurs and consumer electronics and information technology
companies are declining to bring new technology to market out of
fear that they could be bankrupted by an adverse finding of
secondary liability.”246 The FAIR USE Act thus makes such damages
unavailable unless the copyright holder proves that “no reasonable
person could have believed [the] conduct [at issue] to be lawful.”247
The FAIR USE Act was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary and subsequently to the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property. 
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2. The Consumer Technology Bill of Rights
The Consumer Technology Bill of Rights, introduced in their
respective chambers by Representative Christopher Cox of Califor-
nia and Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, is based on the idea that
consumers who legally acquire copyrighted and noncopyrighted
works should be free to use these works in noncommercial ways.248
The Bill delineates the consumer rights in legally acquired copy-
righted and noncopyrighted works as follows: 
(1) The right to record legally acquired video or audio for later
viewing or listening (popularly referred to as “time-shifting”).
(2) The right to use legally acquired content in different places
(popularly referred to as “space-shifting”).
(3) The right to archive or make backup copies of legally
acquired content for use in the event that the original copies
are destroyed.
(4) The right to use legally acquired content on the electronic
platform or device of the consumer's choice.
(5) The right to translate legally acquired content into compa-
rable formats. 
(6) The right to use technology in order to achieve the rights
enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (5).249
No action on these resolutions has been taken since their 2002
referrals to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellec-
tual Property in the House, and to the Committee on the Judiciary
in the Senate.
C. Mandatory Disclosure of TPMs: The Digital Consumer Right to
Know Act of 2003
Upon introducing the Digital Consumer Right to Know Act in
2003,250 Senator Ron Wyden commented that a “not inconceivable”
consequence of the battle against digital piracy is “that digital
media could be more restricted and less flexible than other copy-
righted items—an ironic result for a technology that was supposed
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to represent a great step forward for consumers.”251 In order to
“strengthen the market-based incentive to avoid technologies that
are too restrictive of consumer flexibility,”252 the Act directs the
Federal Trade Commission to issue rules requiring that “a producer
or distributor of copyrighted digital content” disclose the nature of
restrictions “limit[ing] the [purchaser’s] practical ability ... to play,
copy, transmit, or transfer such content on, to, or between devices
... commonly use[d] with respect [thereto].”253 Moreover, the Act
mandates such disclosure in the event that the copyright holder has
placed limitations on: (1) “recording for later viewing or listening”
of certain audio or video programming; (2) “reasonable and noncom-
mercial use of legally acquired audio or video content”; (3) “making
backup copies of legally acquired content ... subject to accidental
erasure, damage, or destruction”; (4) “using limited excerpts of
legally acquired content”; and (5) “engaging in the secondhand
transfer or sale of legally acquired content.”254
No action on the Digital Consumer Right to Know Act has been
taken since its 2003 referral to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation. 
IV. JUDICIAL RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE DMCA
Despite the judiciary’s broad early interpretation of the DMCA
and the accompanying fears raised in the academic community,
courts have begun to turn back the tide by bringing their holdings
more closely, although not completely, in line with congressional
intent. Specifically, courts across the nation have: (a) refused to find
a DMCA violation in the absence of copyright infringement;255 (b)
required for DMCA protection of a TPM that the TPM restrict all
forms of access to a copyrighted work;256 and (c) excluded from the
definition of circumvention mere lack of authorization.257
390 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:349
258. Although in at least one case the Federal Circuit ostensibly applied the law of the
circuit from which appeal was taken, relevant precedent had not been established. See
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc. (Chamberlain III), 381 F.3d 1178, 1191-92
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
259. Id. at 1194.
260. Id. at 1178.
261. Id. at 1183.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1184.
264. Id. at 1185.
A. Narrowing the Scope of the DMCA: Neither Consumers nor
Manufacturers Violate the DMCA if the Challenged              
Circumvention Does Not Threaten Rights Protected Under the
Copyright Act
Although initial DMCA interpretation largely ignored whether an
owner’s copyright was actually infringed by an alleged violation of
the Act, the Federal Circuit’s recent approach explicitly predicates
DMCA liability on such a showing.258 Specifically, the Federal
Circuit held that where circumvention in no way infringes or
facilitates infringing a copyright, the DMCA is not violated.259 In so
interpreting the DMCA, the Federal Circuit attempted to remain
true to the balance Congress intended to strike between the rights
granted to the copyright owner and the rights granted to the public
under the Copyright Act.
The Federal Circuit’s first opportunity to interpret the DMCA
arrived in the unlikely form of garage door openers in Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.260 Chamberlain produced
a garage door opener (GDO) system that continually changed the
radio frequency signal needed to trigger opening of a homeowner’s
garage door.261 The GDO system consisted of three components—a
transmitter operated by the homeowner and a receiver connected to
a motor mounted in the garage.262 With each use, the Chamberlain
transmitter increased a variable component of its radio frequency
signal by a factor of three; software in the Chamberlain receiver
verified this rolling code and, upon verification, activated the GDO
motor.263 Skylink produced a transmitter that circumvented the
Chamberlain receiver’s requirement for a rolling code by in effect re-
setting the receiver with each use.264 Chamberlain accused Skylink
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of violating § 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA.265 Specifically, Chamberlain
alleged that the rolling code software embedded in its receiver was
protected by copyright, that the rolling codes constituted a “techno-
logical measure,” and that the only way for Skylink’s transmitter to
interoperate with the GDO was to “access” the copyrighted rolling
code software.266 Notably, Chamberlain made no accusation that
either Skylink or a third party infringed its software copyrights.267
The district court first denied Chamberlain’s motion for sum-
mary judgment on its DMCA claim268 and later granted Skylink’s
motion for summary judgment.269 For purposes of the latter motion,
the court assumed both that Chamberlain’s rolling code software
was protected by copyright and that the rolling codes controlled
access to that software.270 Nonetheless, the district court concluded
that Chamberlain had failed to demonstrate that the access to
Chamberlain’s copyrighted software enabled by Skylink’s transmit-
ter was unauthorized, as required by the definition of circumvention
in § 1201(a)(3)(A).271 Although GDO consumers had long been able
to purchase aftermarket universal transmitters,272 Chamberlain
imposed no explicit restrictions on the types of transmitters that
purchasers of its GDO system could use.273
The Federal Circuit concurred that Chamberlain failed to
show the lack of authorization required by §  1201(a)(3)(A),274
but more importantly also concluded that Skylink could not be
liable under the DMCA for trafficking in the absence of either
copyright infringement or circumvention of an access-restricting
TPM.275 Looking to the text,276 structure,277 and legislative
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circumvention liability for ‘digital trespass’ under § 1201(a)(1). It also created trafficking
liability under § 1201(a)(2) for facilitating such circumvention and under § 1201(b) for
facilitating infringement.”).
278. Id. at 1196-97 (“The most significant and consistent theme running through the entire
legislative history of the anticircumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA ... is
that Congress attempted to balance competing interests, and ‘endeavored to specify, with as
much clarity as possible, how the right against anti-circumvention would be qualified to
maintain balance between the interests of content creators and information users.’” (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 26 (1998)) (citation omitted)).
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285. Id. at 1202.
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history278 of the DMCA, the Federal Circuit first determined that
§ 1201 establishes only a new cause of action for liability—not a new
property right.279 Furthermore, although Congress, in rebalancing
the competing interests of copyright owners and information users,
had rendered nonequivalent the scope of liability for circumvention
and the scope of liability for infringement,280 the Federal Circuit
emphasized the textual linkage of “access” and “protection” within
the provisions of § 1201.281 To ignore this linkage would be “both
absurd and disastrous,” declared the court.282 It would effectively
give “the owners of a work protected by both copyright and a
technological measure that effectively controls access ... unlimited
rights to hold circumventors liable under § 1201(a) merely for
accessing that work, even if that access enabled only rights that the
Copyright Act grants to the public.”283 Such a result would not only
render irrational Congress’s exercise of its powers under the
Copyright Clause, but also vitiate § 1201(c) of the DMCA.284 
The Federal Circuit concluded that § 1201 “prohibits only forms
of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that
the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.”285 A plaintiff
alleging violation of the DMCA must, therefore, establish the
existence of a “nexus between access and protection”—specifically,
“that the trafficker’s device enables either copyright infringement
or a prohibited circumvention.”286 In establishing this test, the
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Federal Circuit differentiated under the DMCA “between defen-
dants whose accused products enable copying and those ... whose
accused products enable only legitimate uses of copyrighted soft-
ware.”287 For example, in purchasing a Chamberlain GDO system,
consumers gained the “inherent legal right” to use the copyrighted
software embedded in the Chamberlain receiver.288 Accordingly, in
the resultant absence of any allegation of copyright infringement or
circumvention liability under § 1201(a)(1), Skylink could not be
liable for trafficking under § 1201(a)(2).289
The Federal Circuit clarified this same point one year later,
observing that “[t]o the extent that [the copyright owner]’s rights
under copyright law are not at risk, the DMCA does not create a
new source of liability.”290 The plaintiff in Storage Technology Corp.
v. Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc. manufactured
automated tape cartridge libraries capable of storing large quanti-
ties of computer data.291 To access its data, a user of Storage
Technology’s system would send a request to the “Library Manage-
ment Unit,” which then commanded the appropriate “Library
Control Unit” to retrieve the relevant cartridge and send the
requested data over a local area network connecting the two
computers.292 Upon startup, two software programs consisting of
functional and maintenance code automatically loaded into the
RAM of the Library Management and Control Units.293 Storage
Technology’s customers purchased the physical components of this
system but merely licensed the functional portion of the software;
Storage Technology restricted access to the maintenance code
using a password protection scheme.294 To repair data libraries, the
defendant was thus forced to either “crack” or bypass this password
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in order to obtain access to the error messages generated by the
maintenance code.295
Storage Technology sued, claiming that the defendant’s actions
violated § 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA.296 The procedures used by the
defendant not only enabled access to the maintenance code, but also
caused the Library Control and Management Units to reboot, thus
triggering the automatic copying of Storage Technology’s copy-
righted software into RAM.297 The Federal Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction issued by the district court.298 In particular,
the Federal Circuit found it unlikely that Storage Technology would
be able to prove that the defendant’s circumvention of its password
either “‘infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by the
Copyright Act.’”299 First, it was likely that the defendant’s activities
fell within the § 117(c) safe harbor provision for repair and mainte-
nance.300 And second, the software license granted by Storage
Technology to its customers allowed the defendant as the customers’
agent to copy the copyrighted software into RAM.301 
But the Federal Circuit further concluded that no DMCA
violation would have existed even if the software copying triggered
by the defendant’s actions had constituted a copyright infringe-
ment.302 In particular, the Federal Circuit observed that “[a] court
must look at the threat that the unauthorized circumvention
potentially poses in each case to determine if there is a connection
between the circumvention and a right protected by the Copyright
Act.”303 Here, no such nexus existed between the alleged infringe-
ment—copying of software into RAM upon rebooting of the Library
Control and Management Units—and the defendant’s circumven-
tion.304 Such copying occurred whenever the Library Control or
Management Units were rebooted, regardless of the defendant’s
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actions.305 Password circumvention merely allowed the defendant to
use portions of Storage Technology’s copyrighted software306—a use
that may have violated Storage Technology’s customer license but
did not violate copyright law.307
B. Narrowing the Scope of TPMs: Effective Restriction of All
Access to the Underlying Copyrighted Work Predicates DMCA
Protection 
A second method used by courts to restrict the reach of the DMCA
is to afford protection only to those copyrighted works guarded by
robust TPMs. This interpretation finds its basis in the language of
the DMCA itself, which requires that a TPM not only control access,
but do so “effectively.”308 This approach was first taken by the Sixth
Circuit in vacating the preliminary injunction granted by the
district court in Lexmark I.309 Recall that Lexmark developed an
authentication sequence that controlled toner-cartridge access to
software embedded in its printers, thus rendering competitors’
toner cartridges incompatible.310 The district court concluded that
Lexmark’s authentication sequence constituted a TPM because it
“effectively control[led] access to a work protected under [the
copyright provisions]”311 and enjoined defendant SCC from selling
cartridges that mimicked it.312 The Sixth Circuit arguably agreed
with Lexmark that the authentication sequence controlled one form
of access to its copyrighted printer programs—without it a consumer
could not make use of the embedded software.313 The Sixth Circuit
also noted, however, that absence of the authentication sequence did
not prevent any Lexmark printer owner from reading the software’s
binary code directly from the printer memory, translating that
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information into source code, and distributing it.314 Access to
Lexmark’s copyrighted software was thus ultimately controlled not
by the authentication sequence but by printer purchase.315 Referring
to the statutory text, the Sixth Circuit further observed that DMCA
protection requires that the employed technological measure control
access to the copyrighted material “effectively.”316 It accordingly
concluded that § 1201(a)(2) “does not naturally extend to a techno-
logical measure that restricts one form of access but leaves another
route wide open.”317 A TPM must restrict all forms of access for the
protected work to fall within the scope of the DMCA.318
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
applied similar logic in Agfa Monotype Corp. v. Adobe Systems,
Inc.319 Agfa, the owner and distributor of copyrighted TrueType
fonts, alleged that Adobe Acrobat 5.0 violated § 1201 of the
DMCA.320 By embedding a copy of the font data in the transmitted
document, Acrobat allowed a user to create and send PDF docu-
ments such that the recipient could view them in the same format
as the user.321 Where the document transmitted was a form, the
recipient could also insert text into appropriate fields using the
embedded font.322 Agfa used embedding bits to signal to programs
such as Acrobat the font licensing rights possessed by the PDF
creator.323 Version 5.0 of Acrobat, however, for the first time allowed
embedding of TrueType fonts not licensed for editing—such as that
affected by a PDF recipient completing a form field.324 Agfa thus
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contended that Acrobat 5.0 allowed PDF recipients to circumvent
the embedding bits.325
The district court concluded that Agfa’s embedding bits do not
“effectively control access to a work protected under [the Copyright]
title” as required by § 1201(a)(2)(A).326 The files encoding TrueType
fonts can be accessed by software such as Acrobat regardless of the
licensing restrictions indicated by the associated embedding bits.327
Furthermore, embedding bits do not encrypt, scramble, or authenti-
cate TrueType fonts, nor require a program seeking to access, use,
or copy the corresponding files to submit a password or enter an
authentication sequence.328 In fact, the specifications for TrueType
fonts had been available for free download for a decade at the time
of the decision.329
Finally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
similarly applied the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Storage Technology
Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Ltd.330 On
remand, Storage Technology now alleged that circumvention of a
second piece of software was part of its DMCA claim.331 In an
unreported opinion, the court granted summary judgment to the
defendant because Storage Technology’s customers could always
access the underlying code, regardless of TPM implementation.332
C. Narrowing the Scope of Circumvention: Mere Unauthorized
Access Does Not Establish Circumvention of a TPM
Another method used by courts to restrict the reach of the DMCA
is to narrowly interpret the definition of “circumvention.” In I.M.S.
Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd. v. Berkshire Information
Systems, Inc.,333 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
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New York concluded that unauthorized use of an otherwise valid,
owner-issued password to access copyrighted material did not
constitute circumvention for purposes of the DMCA.334 I.M.S., which
provided an online service whereby clients could access advertising
tracking information, sued new competitor Berkshire for an act of
circumvention under § 1201(a).335 Specifically, I.M.S. claimed that
unauthorized use of a legitimate password issued by I.M.S. to a
third party had allowed Berkshire to access its proprietary service
and copy report formats containing copyrightable elements.336
The district court agreed with I.M.S. that its password protection
constituted a “technological measure that effectively controls
access.”337 In applying a valid password issued by I.M.S. to a third
party, however, Berkshire did not avoid or bypass this technological
measure, as required by § 1201(a)(3).338 Rather, what Berkshire
“avoided and bypassed was permission to engage and move through
the technological measure from the measure’s author.”339 Conclud-
ing that mere unauthorized access—as opposed to circumven-
tion—does not violate the DMCA, the court dismissed this claim.340
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia arguably
further narrowed the definition of circumvention by excluding
unauthorized use of an otherwise valid password regardless of the
means by which that password was procured. In Egilman v. Keller
& Heckman, LLP,341 a medical doctor who frequently testified as an
expert in toxic tort cases sued (for violation of the DMCA) a law firm
that accessed his personal website.342 A partner at the firm somehow
procured the username/password combination protecting Dr.
Egilman’s website,343 and used the information posted thereon to
establish that Dr. Egilman had violated a court order prohibiting
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extrajudicial statements.344 Although no allegation was made that
the law firm had obtained the username/password combination from
a third party to whom it had been legitimately issued, the court
found the case indistinguishable from I.M.S. Inquiry.345 The court
concluded it was “irrelevant who provided the username/password
combination to the defendant, or, given that the combination itself
was legitimate, how it was obtained.”346 Given the resulting absence
of circumvention, the court dismissed the DMCA claim.347 
V. REINING IN THE DANGERS OF THE DMCA: MUCH ADO ABOUT
NOTHING?
Although copyright protection promotes public welfare by
encouraging creative expression, it simultaneously limits distribu-
tion of the resultant output.348 The affirmative defense of fair use
balances the need of authors to reap economic benefit with society’s
need to access information and creative content.349 Unfortunately,
early judicial interpretation of the DMCA established a liability
scheme wholly distinct from that of copyright infringement,350
recognizing neither a fair use defense to violation of § 1201(a)(1) nor
a Sony defense to violation of § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1).351
Focused solely on the threat of piracy emerging from the digital
revolution, courts lost sight of the public interest and in effect ceded
all legal power to TPM-deploying copyright owners.352 Even durable
goods containing a modicum of original software benefited from
DMCA protection.353 But in crafting the DMCA, Congress strove
above all to maintain the previous balance between the rights of
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authors and the rights of the public,354 as well as to stimulate
competition and innovation.355 Recent jurisprudence better recog-
nizes this congressional intent through narrower application
of—and perhaps even recognition of a fair use defense to—
§ 1201(a)(1) liability.356 Courts, however, continue to fall short in
failing to recognize the Sony defense with respect to the DMCA’s
antitrafficking provisions.357
A. Balancing the Societal Benefits and Costs of Fair Use
The U.S. Constitution provides for patents and copyrights as an
incentive to inventors and authors, respectively, “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”358 The exclusive rights granted
to an author under copyright law are thus widely seen as promoting
public welfare by rewarding the generation of creative content.359 In
the absence of copyright, an author’s benefits would be reduced by
rivals burdened solely with the costs of copying (as opposed to also
creating) the original work.360 Where the costs of copying are
significant or the copy quality inferior, the author may nonetheless
proceed with the expectation that his work will reap sufficient
reward to outweigh the costs of creation.361 But where the costs of
copying are minor and the copy quality good, the author might well
in the absence of copyright decline to engage in the creative process
at all, leaving society the poorer.362
The advent of digital technology resoundingly tipped the reward
scales against authors.363 Whether engaged in by organized movie
and software piracy rings or individuals using peer-to-peer file-
sharing networks, the ability to quickly create and distribute
innumerable, near-perfect copies of digitized works has become
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commonplace.364 Moreover, it is generally impossible on the Internet
to determine whether material is being distributed lawfully.365 This
change in the copyright landscape in fact created the impetus
behind enactment of the DMCA.366
Yet while rewarding authors with a copyright benefits society by
increasing total creative output, it also works to society’s detriment
by limiting distribution of that output for the term of the
copyright.367 The principle of fair use attempts to mitigate this harm
to society by sometimes allowing what would otherwise be consid-
ered infringement.368 For example, this affirmative defense permits
use of protected materials for purposes such as “criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research” without risk of
liability for copyright infringement.369 Fair use thus attempts to
strike a balance between encouraging creative expression and
allowing public access thereto.370
Ensuring public access to a new work is particularly critical
because creative expression does not arise in a vacuum. To the
contrary, as explained by Professor Landes and Judge Posner,
“[c]reating a new work typically involves borrowing or building on
material from a prior body of works, as well as adding original
expression to it.”371 Thus, elimination of the fair use exception to the
copyright regime would leave society with less creative output, just
as would be expected in the absence of copyright law itself.372 
For example, almost as startling as the technological advances of
the digital revolution is the public’s eagerness to post its own
creative content on the Internet. In particular, from fan fiction to
machinima to YouTube, individuals are choosing to engage with
mass media content by creating unauthorized derivative works to
402 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:349
373. See generally HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA
COLLIDE 2-4, 21 (2006).
374. See, e.g., id. at 186.
375. Id. at 186-87. In 2001, for example, Warner Bros. sent cease-and-desist letters
demanding that various unauthorized Harry Potter fan sites be removed. Many of these sites
were run by teenagers. Warner Bros. backed down after the teens gained media attention
through their “Defense Against the Dark Arts” organization. Id.; see Tim Wu, American
Lawbreaking Tolerated Use: The Copyright Problem, SLATE, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.slate.
com/id/2175730/entry/2175731/. See generally JENKINS, supra note 373, at 185-88.
376. See JENKINS, supra note 373, at 189-91 (suggesting fan-studio collaboration as a
solution until the scope of the fair use exception is clarified).
377. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 51 (2001). 
378. See supra Part II.A.
379. Some members of Congress appear to have adopted this interpretation. See, e.g., 144
CONG. REC. E2136, E2137 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley) (observing with
respect to § 1201(a)(1)(C), “it will be particularly important for this provision to be interpreted
further explore characters and plot lines.373 In many cases, media
companies have threatened legal action to shut down such sites;374
fans sometimes prevail via the publicity storm that may subse-
quently arise.375 Whether the fair use exception encompasses such
fan fiction, however, remains unclear—leaving individuals largely
at the mercy of Hollywood and no doubt discouraging creative
expression that would otherwise occur.376
The DMCA places the force of law behind any TPM created by a
copyright holder, thus shifting from the state to the copyright holder
de facto control over who is permitted to access creative content.377
Yet the DMCA contains no requirement that any such TPM be
designed to allow fair use; nor does any economic incentive exist for
the copyright holder to design TPMs to enable such exceptions. The
antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA further compound this
problem—if a TPM does not allow fair use and the end user has no
access to devices that enable circumvention of the TPM, then the
end user will have no way to exercise fair use rights.
Analysis of legislative history reveals that Congress did not
intend to overrule either fair use or the Sony defense when enacting
the DMCA.378 Admittedly, the text of the DMCA does not explicitly
establish either as an affirmative defense to a § 1201 violation.
Moreover, the role ascribed to the Librarian of Congress in
§ 1201(a)(1)(C)—together with the additional exemptions to liability
under the DMCA for activities such as reverse engineering—may be
viewed as Congress’s attempt to protect consumer fair use rights.379
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But as specifically indicated in the House Report from the
Committee on the Judiciary: 
[Section 1201](a)(1) does not apply to the subsequent actions of
a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy
of a work protected under Title 17, even if such actions involve
circumvention of additional forms of technological protection
measures. In a fact situation where the access is authorized, the
traditional defenses to copyright infringement, including fair
use, would be fully applicable. So, an individual would not be
able to circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a
work, but would be able to do so in order to make fair use of a
work which he or she has acquired lawfully.380
Similarly, § 1201(a)(2)—and by analogy the parallel § 1201(b)(1)
—“is drafted carefully to target ‘black boxes,’ and to ensure that
legitimate multipurpose devices can continue to be made and
sold.”381 Nor does the text of the DMCA explicitly expand copyright
protection in such a way as to lessen fair use rights—to the
contrary, § 1201(c)(1) “instructs the courts explicitly not to construe
the anticircumvention provisions in ways that would effectively
repeal longstanding principles of copyright law.”382
The Sony Court itself relied on the words (and wisdom) of Justice
Stewart, which bear repeating as we continue our journey through
a fair use landscape shaped by the DMCA. In considering how to
approach ambiguities in the law of copyright, Justice Stewart
observed:
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
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motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an “author’s” creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. “The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly,” this Court has said, “lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.”383 
Accordingly, Justice Stewart concluded that “[w]hen technological
change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act
must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”384 Just as the Sony
Court kept its eye on the basic purpose of the Copyright Act, so
should today’s judiciary in interpreting the DMCA. 
Thus, while Congress sought to encourage authors and innovators
to continue creating socially valuable works when it enacted the
DMCA, we must never lose sight of the fact that an equally
compelling goal is to see those works publicly disseminated to as
broad an audience as possible. After all, the best incentives to create
are of no benefit whatsoever if the resulting creations never reach
their audience.385 
B. Love’s Labours Lost
In the first years following enactment of the DMCA, courts
intently focused on preventing piracy and protecting copyright
owners.386 In particular, by interpreting § 1201 as establishing a
liability regime wholly distinct from that of infringement, the
judiciary caused fair use and the Sony defense to fall by the
wayside.387 As the Federal Circuit later explained, such an interpre-
tation seemed plausible because:
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389. Id. at 1196 (citation omitted).
390. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.2, at 26 (2d Sess. 1998) (observing that the
proposed legislation “fully respects and extends into the digital environment the bedrock
principle of ‘balance’ in American intellectual property law for the benefit of both copyright
owners and users”); 144 CONG. REC. E2144, E2144 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Tauzin) (noting that in its final form the DMCA preserved “balance between copyright
protection and the exchange of ideas in the free-market—two of the fundamental pillars upon
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391. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097-98
(N.D. Cal. 2004); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127211,
at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
[T]he statute’s structure could be seen to suggest that § 1201(b)
strengthens a copyright owner’s abilities to protect its recog-
nized rights, while § 1201(a) strengthens a copyright owner’s
abilities to protect access to its work without regard to the
legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the actions that the accused access
enables.388
Sadly, this interpretation came at the expense of congressional
intent and overall societal welfare. 
As enacted, the DMCA embodies a carefully crafted compromise
between the concerns of content creators and the concerns of the
consuming public. The Federal Circuit has observed that “[t]he most
significant and consistent theme running through the entire
legislative history of the anticircumvention and anti-trafficking
provisions of the DMCA ... is that Congress attempted to balance
competing interests ....”389 Time and again the legislative history
refers to the need for balance between copyright protection and the
public’s access to information.390 
Rather than weigh the potential injury to the public resulting
from strict DMCA application, courts nonetheless appeared un-
able to move beyond the harm that might be caused to the TPM-
deploying copyright owner. The fact that a consumer’s use of the
Streambox device or of DVD decryption-and-copying software
enabled noninfringing uses (e.g., downloading or decrypting files for
subsequent, private fair use of the work) thus provided no shield for
the defendants,391 even though it would have under the contributory
liability scheme of Sony. As one court summarized: “Equipment
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Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 2-3, 7 (2005) (statement of Jonathan Band on behalf of
NetCoalition), available at http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/jbfairuse2.pdf.
395. Chamberlain III, 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Perhaps because of its patent
law expertise, the Federal Circuit made this risk explicit.
396. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
397. Id. § 103(a).
398. Id. § 101.
manufacturers in the twenty-first century will need to vet their
products for compliance with Section 1201 in order to avoid a
circumvention claim, rather than under Sony to negate a copyright
claim.”392
Moreover, courts became so preoccupied with the threat of piracy
that they neglected the public interest in harnessing the amazing
technologies emerging from the digital revolution. To the contrary,
the greater the ease, convenience, and quality of the circumvention,
the more compelling the courts perceived the injury to the copyright
owner to be.393 The courts thus failed to imagine a future where
most, if not all, information is distributed digitally, and where
unbending enforcement of TPMs not only interferes with an
individual’s enjoyment of his music collection but also generally
impedes economic and cultural progress. Today, for example, almost
any action involving a computer or the Internet requires the making
of a copy.394
The dramatic broadening of the definition of a TPM effected by
Lexmark I raised an additional specter: perpetual patent-like pro-
tection for durable goods under copyright law. Where use of a
product in which TPM-protected software is embedded necessarily
requires “access” of that software, the manufacturer theoretically
has the ability to restrict consumer use of the product under the
DMCA, and thus to control the aftermarket uses of the product.395
This came in direct contravention of congressional intent and
allowed potentially endless protection of works that would have
never satisfied traditional requirements for patentability:
(1) novelty,396 (2) nonobviousness,397 and (3) utility.398 These three
criteria for obtaining patent protection serve a vital purpose—
ensuring that innovations increase social welfare, and further
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guaranteeing that they eventually reach the public domain after the
patent term has expired (currently twenty years from the date of
patent application filing).399 In so doing, society strikes a balance
between providing innovators necessary incentives to create socially
valuable works on the one hand, and allowing consumers and the
public access to those works on the other. This latter point regard-
ing public access is especially crucial given the fact that the vast
majority of innovations are not “pioneering” ones, but rather, ones
which gradually build off of other works that previously have been
patented, and which have now reached the end of their monopoly
protection period.400 Once inventions reach the public domain, there
is often a flurry of new innovation and competition, which invari-
ably inures to the benefit of the consuming public.401 
Nevertheless, early DMCA jurisprudence threatened to undo that
delicate balance by providing near-perpetual protection to works
that would have never qualified for such rights previously.402 It is
absolutely essential then that future DMCA interpretation be
cognizant of this insidious risk, and return to a serious consider-
ation of the public rights and interests at stake. Narrow focus on
protection of copyright holders to the detriment of free competition
and innovation was certainly not what Congress envisioned.403
C. Judicial Awakening: Inching Back Toward an Understanding
of the DMCA Congruent with Congressional Intent
More recent jurisprudence is bringing interpretation and
application of the DMCA better in line with congressional in-
tent—both as expressed during enactment of the DMCA and as
indicated by legislation proposed thereafter.404 Specifically, the
Federal Circuit appears well on its way to recognizing fair use as an
affirmative defense to § 1201(a)(1), the Sixth Circuit’s approach
408 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:349
405. See supra notes 308-47 and accompanying text.
406. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 18 (2d Sess. 1998) (observing that under
§ 1201(a)(1), “an individual would not be able to circumvent [a TPM] in order to gain
unauthorized access to a work, but would be able to do so in order to make fair use of a work
which he or she has acquired lawfully”); 144 CONG. REC. E2144, E2144 (daily ed. Oct. 13,
1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“We also sought to ensure that consumers could apply their
centuries-old fair use rights in the digital age.”); 144 CONG. REC. H10615, H10621 (daily ed.
Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Klug) (observing that “information users will continue to
utilize information on a ‘fair use’ basis, notwithstanding the prohibition on circumvention”);
144 CONG. REC. H7074, H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley) (observing
that § 1201(a)(1) “was crafted by the Commerce Committee to protect ‘fair use’”).
407. See supra Part II.C.1.
408. See supra Part III.
409. Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. § 5(b)(1) (2005);
see supra Part III.A.1.
410. The Consumer Technology Bill of Rights, S.J. Res. 51, 107th Cong. § 3 (2d Sess. 2002);
see supra Part III.B.1.
places durable goods beyond the scope of the DMCA (at least for
now), and courts generally are less likely to find weak TPMs
deserving of DMCA recognition.405 Nonetheless, the Sony defense
continues to lie fallow with respect to the § 1201(a)(2) and
§ 1201(b)(1) antitrafficking provisions.
1. The Federal Circuit’s Approach Likely Establishes Fair Use
as a Defense to a Section 1201(a)(1) Violation
In enacting the DMCA, Congress intended fair use to constitute
a defense to an alleged violation of § 1201(a)(1).406 In light of the
courts’ initial interpretation of § 1201 as creating a liability regime
distinct from copyright infringement and thus not limited by fair
use,407 multiple amendments to the DMCA were proposed.408 For
example, the DMCRA would modify § 1201(c)(1) to make explicit
that “it is not a violation of [§ 1201] to circumvent a technological
measure in order to obtain access to the work for purposes of
making noninfringing use of the work.”409 Similarly, the Consumer
Technology Bill of Rights would specify that the owners of legally
acquired copyrighted works possess “the right to use technology in
order to achieve ... enumerated [rights]” such as time-shifting and
creation of backup copies.410 More stringently, the BALANCE Act
would allow circumvention of a TPM by the lawful owner of a
protected work, but only where: (1) “necessary to make a
noninfringing use” thereof, and (2) the copyright owner has failed to
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make available, without additional cost or burden, the means to
make the noninfringing use.411 
The Federal Circuit’s approach appears to be in accord with that
of the DMCRA, suggesting that it may recognize fair use as an
affirmative defense to a § 1201(a)(1) violation. In both Chamberlain
and Storage Technology, the Federal Circuit explicitly recognized
that a § 1201(a) violation requires proof “that the circumvention of
the technological measure either ‘infringes or facilitates infringing
a right protected by the Copyright Act.’”412 A violation of § 1201(a)(1)
necessarily focuses on the person committing the challenged
circumvention, as opposed to the person manufacturing or distribut-
ing the means of circumvention.413 Under the Federal Circuit’s
standard, therefore, no § 1201(a)(1) violation occurs if the person
committing the challenged circumvention has not infringed—or
facilitated infringing—the TPM-protected work. In Storage Technol-
ogy, for example, the Federal Circuit foreclosed a § 1201(a)(1) claim
to the extent that the defendant’s activities fell within the § 117(c)
safe harbor for computer maintenance and repair, and thus did not
constitute copyright infringement.414 Like § 117(c), § 107 establishes
a safe harbor from copyright infringement—but for fair use rather
than maintenance and repair activities.415 Although the Federal
Circuit expressly declined to consider the defendant’s § 107 fair use
defense in Storage Technology,416 applying the court’s logic nonethe-
less indicates that a person who circumvents a TPM in order to
effect a fair use does not violate § 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA.
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2. The Federal Circuit’s Approach Falls Short of Establishing
Fair Use as a Defense to a Section 1201(a)(2) Violation
Just as it did not intend to eliminate fair use as a defense to
circumvention, so Congress did not intend to make the Sony defense
inapplicable to § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b)(1) of the DMCA.417 For
example, after first observing that the language initially proposed
by the Clinton administration would have overruled Sony,418
Representative Bliley, in the final Commerce Committee report,
described the intended effect of the revised antitrafficking provi-
sions as follows:
Sections 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1) make it illegal to manufacture,
import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in so-
called “black boxes”—devices with no substantial non-infringing
uses that are expressly intended to facilitate circumvention of
technological measures for purposes of gaining access to or
making a copy of a work. These provisions are not aimed at
widely used staple articles of commerce, such as the consumer
electronics, telecommunications, and computer products ... used
by businesses and consumers everyday for perfectly legitimate
purposes.419
Circumvention devices with substantial noninfringing uses were
thus envisioned by Congress as being beyond the scope of the
DMCA.420 Nonetheless, in the years immediately following its
enactment, courts held Sony overruled “to the extent of any
inconsistency between Sony and the [DMCA].”421 
In response to the judicial interpretation of § 1201 as prohibiting
“fair uses ... as well as foul,”422 legislators again proposed amend-
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ments to the text of the DMCA. The DMCRA, for example, would
create a new § 1201(c)(5), specifying that “[e]xcept in instances of
direct infringement, it shall not be a violation of the Copyright Act
to manufacture or distribute a hardware or software product
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”423 More stringently, the
BALANCE Act would not impose liability for the manufacture and
distribution of circumvention devices so long as: (1) the device is
“necessary to make a noninfringing use” of a TPM-protected work;
(2) the device is designed, produced, and marketed for noninfringing
use; and (3) the copyright owner has failed to make available,
without additional cost or burden, the means to make the
noninfringing use.424
Although the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain took steps toward
recognizing a fair use defense to § 1201(a)(2), it stopped far short of
that goal. Admittedly, the Federal Circuit did establish as an
express element of a § 1201(a)(2) allegation that the circumvention
means allow access that “infringes or facilitates infringing a right
protected by the Copyright Act.”425 Nonetheless, the court seemed to
imply throughout its opinion that the only instance in which
§ 1201(a)(2) liability is inapposite is where the circumvention means
would allow only noninfringing uses of the TPM-protected work.426
In other words, so long as the plaintiff can point to one infringing
use that the circumvention means would enable, a § 1201(a)(2)
violation can be found.427 That the circumvention means may be
capable of substantial noninfringing uses thus appears irrelevant
under the Federal Circuit’s approach.
412 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:349
428. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt.2, at 25 (2d Sess. 1998) (“[T]he digital environment
poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners, and as such, necessitates protection
against devices that undermine copyright interests. In contrast to the analog experience,
digital technology enables pirates to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of works—at
virtually no cost at all to the pirate. As technology advances, so must our laws. The
Committee thus seeks to protect the interests of copyright owners in the digital environment,
while ensuring that copyright law remain technology neutral.”); 144 CONG. REC. E2144, E2144
(daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (observing that in enacting the DMCA,
“we ensure that authors and their works will be protected from pirates who pillage their way
through cyberspace”); 144 CONG. REC. H7074, H7092 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Coble) (“While digital dissemination of copies will benefit owners and consumers, it will
unfortunately also facilitate pirates who aim to destroy the value of American intellectual
property.”); id. at H7096 (statement of Rep. Boucher) (noting that “new protections are needed
due to the ease with which flawless copies of copyrighted materials can both be made and
transmitted in the digital network environment”); id. at H7099 (statement of Rep. Oxley)
(“The digital revolution presents special opportunities and special challenges for copyright
holders and users of copyrighted works.”).
429. See supra text accompanying notes 206-17.
430. Chamberlain III, 381 F.3d at 1201.
3. Limiting the DMCA to the Digital World
The entertainment industry’s fears that the digital revolution
would gravely weaken copyright protection in large part drove
enactment of the DMCA. References to the need to protect authors
from the new ability to quickly create and transmit perfect digital
copies of copyrighted works permeate the legislative history.428 Yet
the district court’s liberal interpretation of TPMs in Lexmark I
appeared to expand DMCA protection beyond the digital environ-
ment to durable goods.429 As later recognized by the Federal Circuit
in a different context, such a broad statutory interpretation “would
allow any manufacturer of any product to add a single copyrighted
sentence or software fragment to its product, wrap the copyrighted
material in a trivial ‘encryption scheme,’ and thereby gain the right
to restrict consumers’ rights to use its products in conjunction with
competing products.”430 Surprisingly, legislation to exclude durable
goods from DMCA protection has not been enacted.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit appears to envision application of
the DMCA as limited primarily to the type of multimedia works that
the entertainment industry initially sought to protect. In settling on
a standard for DMCA applicability, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
observed that “[i]n the essential setting where the DMCA applies,
the copyright protection operates on two planes: in the literal code
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governing the work and in the visual or audio manifestation
generated by the code’s execution.”431 Where software is “purely
functional” and does not further generate copyrightable expres-
sion—such as the audiovisual display of a video game—its manufac-
turer might use a TPM to restrict the software’s use, but is unlikely
to use a second TPM to protect the code itself.432 Thus, by requiring
that a TPM restrict all forms of access to a protected work,433 the
Sixth Circuit arguably narrowed the scope of the DMCA to more
closely match what Congress originally intended. Whether the Sixth
Circuit’s presumption regarding TPMs guarding purely functional
software proves correct, however, remains to be seen.
4. A Weak TPM Does Not Outweigh the Public Interest in  
Information Access
The outcomes in Lexmark II, Agfa Monotype, I.M.S. Inquiry, and
Egilman also suggest that courts are increasingly unwilling to
curtail the rights of the content-consuming public when copyright
owners fail to use robust TPMs.434 Lexmark restricted use of its
proprietary software—but neglected to protect the code itself.435
Agfa passively shared information about the limits of its font users’
license rights—but employed no measure that would actually
prohibit a user from exceeding the scope of its copyright license.436
And both I.M.S. and Dr. Egilman protected their copyrighted work
using only a username and password437—information that can be
easily shared or even, as seems likely in the latter case, guessed.438
Together, these decisions sensibly suggest decreased judicial
tolerance for an expansive reading of the DMCA.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, early DMCA jurisprudence found courts blindly intent on
preventing piracy and protecting copyright holders.439 Sadly, such
holdings came at the expense of fair use, public access, competition,
innovation, and overall social welfare. As a result, manufacturers
and distributors of enabling technology were intimidated by the
threat of civil and even criminal liability for a violation of the
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions, no exceptions granted.
Hence, consumers found themselves unable to use much of the
amazing technology emerging from the digital revolution, even in
those instances in which such uses would have constituted fair uses
under Sony. Thus, a film professor who simply wanted to excerpt
movie clips to teach his students about the tools of the trade would
no longer be able to find the necessary technology to carry out his
calling, all in the name of allegedly protecting copyright holders
against piracy. Creative works would be locked out of the public
domain, stifling the innovation and competition that the DMCA was
supposed to promote, not deter.
In the next round of DMCA litigation, the fate of fair use went
from bad to worse.440 As defendants abandoned attempts to rely on
the Sony/fair use defense, courts turned instead toward the question
of how broadly the term “technology protection measure” could be
interpreted. Simply put, the answer was extremely broad—consider,
for example, the Lexmark printer microchip.441 This expansive
interpretation threatened to result in near-perpetual, patent-like
protection for durable goods that lacked even a remote chance of
receiving patent protection under existing law.
Thankfully, more recent DMCA jurisprudence has begun to rein
in the dangers of this legislation.442 Courts are awakening from
industry’s spell, with the Federal Circuit’s approach likely to
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establish a fair use defense to at least a § 1201(a)(1) DMCA
violation.443 Some courts also appear willing to limit DMCA
protection to the digital world, rather than allow its reach to
encompass all durable goods.444 Finally, courts have begun to
balance the interests of innovators with that of the public, recogniz-
ing that a weak TPM does not outweigh the substantial public
interest in information access.445 
In the final analysis, it is crucial for overall social welfare that
courts continue to rein in early DMCA jurisprudence to bring
practice in line with principles: to foster creation and innovation
without unduly harming public access. Thus far, the courts have
fallen short of fully enforcing congressional intent, as no court has
yet explicitly recognized fair use as a defense to violation of the
DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions.446 The years ahead will
reveal if the judiciary is able to realize the ideals embodied within
the principles of copyright protection.
